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This  paper  examines  the  relative  importance  of  global  and  domestic  factors  as  a 
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related domestic variables. The US corporate bond spread is used as a measure of 
international risk aversion. The relative importance of global factors to the volatility 
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strategy, whereby foreign variables are treated as block exogenous. The estimates 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The evolution of emerging market credit spreads has attracted a great deal of attention throughout 
the last ten years. Most of the empirical literature on this issue has focused on the relationship 
between  credit  spreads  (of  different  debt  instruments),  credit  ratings  and  macroeconomic 
variables. The rationale behind the consideration of the way in which credit spreads relate to 
these variables has been threefold: (i) to test the significance of the predictions coming from 
theoretical  models  studying  such  relationships;  (ii)  to  improve  the  forecasts  of  debt-related 
financial variables; (iii)  and to check the truthfulness of market commentary and widespread 
beliefs  (such  as  the  idea  that  appetite  for  risk  grows  in  low  interest  rate  environments).  A 
significant part of the literature - among which Eichengreen and Mody (1997) and Kamin and 
Kleist (1999) represent two of the most prominent works - has taken the form of panel data 
analysis. While sharing similar goals, the various papers differed in the techniques they adopted, 
in the samples they investigated (i.e. either countries or time periods) and in the variables on 
which they focused. However, these works shared one weakness: they neglected the fact that 
sovereign  credit  spreads  are  important  determinants  of  debt  service  and,  therefore,  of  debt 
sustainability.  
More recently, the  endogenous  role of credit spreads in macroeconomic volatility has 
attracted the attention of researchers, and credit spreads have started being treated as endogenous 
variables  in  a  growing  number  of  papers.  However,  since  most  of  the  authors  draw  on  the 
assumption that credit spreads move together with domestic business cycles, they have studied 
the interaction of credit spreads with those factors that are commonly considered to affect the 
business  cycle,  but  not  with  those  relating  to  debt  sustainability.  As  a  consequence,  limited 
attention has been devoted to the study of the interaction in emerging market economies between 
credit spreads, foreign investors’ risk aversion and sovereign debt dynamics
1. Ignoring the fact 
that foreign investors are risk averse and that their degree of risk aversion can change over time 
has  potentially  serious  consequences  on  the  validity  of  the  results  of  such  empirical 
investigations. Therefore, while studying the determinants of emerging market credit spreads, the 
contribution of global risk aversion should not be neglected. On this basis, this work jointly 
attempts to take seriously the endogeneity of the credit spreads, and to relate them to the degree 
                                                 
1 One exception is represented by Arora and Cerisola (2001), where the authors consider, among the regressors, US 
interest rates and measures of market sentiment. However, as the authors resort to a one-equation estimation method, 
the endogeneity issue is not fully taken into account. The same holds for Gonzales-Rozada and Levy (2005)    
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of risk aversion of international investors, as well as to traditional domestic and international 
macroeconomic factors. 
In particular, in this work I analyse the determinants of Brazilian credit spreads (from 
January 1995 to January 2004), taking into consideration both of the observations made above, in 
terms of the endogeneity of credit spreads and the role of foreign variables. In Section 2, I shall 
propose a brief review of the literature. In Section 3 I shall illustrate the theoretical reasons that 
lie behind the choice of the model to estimate and of the variables to encompass. The data will be 
described in Section 4, and in Section 5 I will estimate a VAR model including foreign variables 
(US federal funds rates, US production, and US_BAA spread) as well as domestic Brazilian 
variables (external debt, primary deficit, EMBI spread, and other macro variables). The main goal 
of the paper is to appraise the historical contribution of the internal and external factors to the 
evolution  of  the  Brazilian  domestic  variables  under  scrutiny,  and  to  analyse  the  relative 
importance of the internal and external factors once i) credits spreads are treated as endogenous, 
and ii) a measure of global appetite for risk is included among their determinants. By exploiting 
the  fact  that  the  foreign  factors  are  presumably  only  marginally  affected  by  Brazilian 
macroeconomic variables, in Section 6 I shall disentangle and quantify the historical relative 
impact of the foreign factors on the Brazilian domestic variables
2. In Section 7, I shall take on a 
second  task:  assuming  a  recursive  causality  order  between  the  endogenous  variables,  I  shall 
calculate the impulse response functions of the endogenous variables in the system, so as to better 
understand the potential contributions of the diverse shocks to the evolution of the endogenous 
variables. At the end of the analysis, I shall discuss briefly the robustness of the results.  
 
2. Review of the literature on credit risk spreads and debt dynamics. 
 
In the last few years, a growing number of researchers have recognised that the previous 
literature  failed  to  treat  credit  spreads  as  endogenous  variables,  affecting  and  affected  by 
domestic and international macroeconomic conditions. 
                                                 
2  Other  works  exploit  block  exogeneity  in  VAR  systems  to  study  the  contribution  of  foreign  variables  on  the 
domestic ones. Let me recall here Genberg, Salemi and Swoboda (1987), Cushman and Zha (1997) and Genberg 
(2003). In what follows, I will stick to the structure and strategy used in these analyses. Other authors employ 
different techniques to gauge the relative importance of internal and external factors, as, for instance, restricted 
Structural VARs (see, for instance, Gerlach-Kristen (2006) for the case of Hong Kong). Calvo et a.l (1993), instead, 
use a principal component analysis to create two proxies  of external impulses and insert them in a block exogenous 
SVAR to evaluate their relative contribution to the forecast error variance of international reserves and real exchange 
rates.  Canova  (2005)  first  identifies  supply,  real  demand  and  monetary  US  disturbances,  then  exploits  a  prior 
specification with cross-sectional information to estimate the response of some Latin American countries.    
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Uribe  and  Yue  (2006)  clearly  realize  this  issue  and,  by  focusing  on  seven  emerging 
market economies,  estimate a VAR model encompassing foreign and  domestic interest rates, 
trade balance to output ratio, real gross domestic investment, and real gross domestic output. 
These variables are chosen among those that most commonly appear in classical IRBC models. 
Despite these authors improving on previous analyses, as they take into account the simultaneous 
relationship  between  credit  spreads  and  macro-variables,  they  do  not  include  those  domestic 
factors which are indeed important for debt sustainability (namely, debt/gdp ratio, fiscal primary 
balance/gdp ratio and nominal variables), nor do they consider all relevant foreign variables (such 
as measures of appetite for risk). In other words, despite tackling the issue of the simultaneity of 
credit spreads, they do not encompass those factors which are reasonably connected to credit 
spreads, but not to real business cycles. Their choice of neglecting these variables is consistent 
with their interest in the determinants of the real business cycles, and not in those of the credit 
risk  premia  per  se.  However,  the  risk  is  that,  failing  to  recognise  that  credit  spreads  do  not 
exclusively depend on business cycles but also on other debt-related  macroeconomic factors, 
their model is misspecified and relevant variables are omitted.  
Garcia and Rigobon (2005) abandon the panel data approach and focus their investigation 
on Brazil alone. They estimate a large VAR model for the Brazilian economy (over the period 
1994-July  2003)  where  debt,  deficit  and  other  nominal  and  real  variables  are  included.  The 
authors do not utilise EMBI spreads or other credit spread measures in their model, but, rather, 
they set up a VAR system including many of the alleged determinants of credit risk premia. Their 
choice  follows  a  two-step  strategy:  first,  they  estimate  a  VAR  model  able  to  forecast  the 
stochastic evolution of sovereign debt in the future, and, afterwards, they relate such predictions 
to the credit spreads actually recorded in the markets. Unfortunately, since they do not encompass 
any foreign factors among the variables of the VAR model, the latter loses the ability to explain 
the  variance  of  credit  spreads  and  debt  which  is  instead  attributable  to  such  foreign  factors. 
Following an approach which is similar in spirit to Garcia and Rigobon (2005), Hostland and 
Karam (2005) propose a framework to assess debt sustainability in emerging market economies 
based on stochastic simulation methods. The authors take into account the interaction among 
economic variables and, in particular, the endogeneity of risk premia (p. 6). Their contribution, 
however, differs from the present work in two main aspects. First, Hostland and Karam aim at 
highlighting the key factors influencing prospective debt sustainability in a stochastic framework 
where the joint likelihood of several adverse shocks is considered, whereas I am interested in 
explaining the data and the relationship among the series over a historical period. Second, they do 
not consider the role played by external factors in the evolution of emerging market fluctuations,    
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while this is one of the main themes of this work. Tanner and Samake (2006) address the first of 
the two observations above, and assess debt sustainability (in a stochastic simulation model) not 
only  prospectively  but  also  retrospectively.  Tanner  and  Samake,  however,  do  not  tackle  the 
second point, since they do not embed external factors in their study (expect for the growth in oil 
prices).  In addition, they neglect the endogeneity of risk premia and credit spreads which is, 
instead, extremely important for the development of external debt . 
  Focusing  on  the  consequences  of  limited  enforcement  constraints  in  sovereign  debt 
markets, Neumeyer and Perri  (2005) build a theoretical general equilibrium model for a small 
open economy to account for a series of stylised facts, namely that, in emerging economies, i) 
business cycles are more volatile than in developed nations, ii) real interest rates are counter 
cyclical and lead the cycle, iii) consumption is more volatile than output, and iv) net exports are 
strongly counter cyclical. These authors decompose the real interest rate into two independent 
determinants, that are an international interest rate and a country risk component. In the words of 
the authors,  
“Because fluctuations in country risk spreads are large, we consider two simple 
polar (non-mutually exclusive) approaches to their determination. The first is that 
factors that are largely independent of domestic conditions (like foreign rates, 
contagion, or political factors) drive country risk. In the second approach changes 
in country risk are induced by the fundamental shocks to a country’s economy 
(productivity shocks in our model). In this case, these shocks drive, at the same 
time, business cycles and fluctuations in country risk.” (Neumeyer and Perri 2005 
p 347).  
 
It  is  clear  from  the  excerpt  above  that  the  authors  recognise  that  domestic  interest  rates  are 
affected by  three different sources of uncertainty:  foreign “risky” interest rates  (in their turn 
determined by foreign short term interest rates and foreign investors’ appetite for risk), external 
shocks (such as contagion, political factors, foreign crises), and domestic determinants (such as 
inflation, exchange rates, unemployment, debt levels, debt currency composition, volatility of the 
tax base, and the like).  The authors, however,  decide not to model the default process; they 
assume that the probability of default is inversely related to domestic productivity shocks. In so 
doing, however, foreign risk aversion does not come to play that crucial role it actually has in 
generating  or  amplifying  the  fluctuations  of  domestic  credit  spreads,  debt  level  and  other 
macroeconomic  variables.  The  authors  do  highlight  the  fact  that  domestic  risk  premia  affect 
domestic interest rates and amplify the volatility of the business cycles, yet they do not model 
domestic risk premia and thus, fail to take into account that the interest rates themselves affect the 
premia. Accordingly, the issue I empirically address in this work is acknowledged, yet not fully 
treated in their theoretical contribution.    
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   In their paper on debt “intolerance”, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) recognise that 
the “interest rate a country must pay on its debt is an endogenous variable, which depends, among 
other things, on the country debt-to-output  ratio.” (p. 41). Also in this case, although the authors 
acknowledge the endogeneity of credit risk spreads, they neither directly tackle the issue, nor do 
they try to formalise it in a proper model, probably because this task would have gone beyond the 
scope of their analysis and interests.  
Building on Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and others, Arellano (2005) proposes a theoretical 
RBC model in which she endogenises interest rates by linking spreads to default probabilities. 
The novelty is that default is optimally decided, and it is neither exogenous nor rule-determined. 
In  a  nutshell,  the  fluctuations  of  output  affect  the  incentives  to  default,  the  changes  in  the 
incentives to default determine the volatility of bond prices, and the latter is mirrored in the 
interest rate volatility. It follows that real shocks in the tradable and non-tradable sectors cause 
counter-cyclical and highly volatile interest rates
3. Domestic interest rates are affected by the 
probability  of  default  because  investors  require  an  adjustment  to  the  expected  payoffs  of 
defaultable bonds (i.e. the payoff of a defaultable bond is lower than an identical but safer one as 
long as the probability of default is positive). Following the literature, Arellano assumes investors 
to be risk neutral. It follows that no risk premia are in the model. In fact, credit spreads merely 
reflect the differences in the expected rates of return of defaultable and risk-free instruments, yet 
not  those  ‘additional’  premia  that  investors  typically  require  to  undertake  the  risk.  As  a 
consequence, the domestic interest rate volatility does depend on the changes in the expected 
probability of default due to output fluctuations, yet not on foreign lenders’ risk aversion. In 
addition, the feedback of domestic interest rates on the other macroeconomic variables is not 
fully endogenised.  
  A contribution that is very much in line with the idea underlying this investigation is 
represented by Fiees (2003). Starting from the observation that “it has been widely recognized 
that  both  country-specific  and  global  factors  matter  in  explaining  capital  flows”  (p.  1),    and 
following the approach by Calvo et al. (1993), Fiees uses a principal component analysis to 
“disentangle  the  relative  weight  of  country-specific  and  global  factors  in  determining  capital 
flows” (p. 1). He starts by separating the common component of emerging country spreads from 
the  country-specific  ones.  Then,  he  uses  the  pure  country-specific  risk  and  two  global 
                                                 
3  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  Arellano’s  work,  the  optimal  level  of  debt  is  endogenously  determined  in 
equilibrium. The debt level does not imply default alone. In fact, it is not the level of debt per se, but, rather, its 
interaction with i) real shocks, ii) exchange rate volatility and iii) default probabilities that makes a certain level of 
debt sustainable or not. I am sympathetic with this approach because it treats the choice to default and the credit 
spreads as endogenous stochastic variables, interacting with other variables in the economy.     
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components  (i.e.  “contagion”  and  U.S.  long-term  interest  rates)  as  “explanatory  variables  to 
account for the observed pattern of capital flows using multivariate cointegration analyses” (p. 1). 
Doing so, he identifies the relative weight of global and country-specific factors in explaining 
capital  flows  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  and  Venezuela  in  the  1990s.  In  a  nutshell,  Fiees 
decomposes country risk and disentangles its main determinants. He finds that the determinants 
of capital flows and sovereign bond spreads can be jointly identified in a small system. He claims 
that capital flows are driven by country risk and global factors (i.e. “contagion” and U.S. long-
term interest rates), while the primary balance-to- GDP ratio (-) and the ratio of public debt to 
GDP (+) determine country risk. This implies that capital flows are determined by country risk, 
and not, as often argued in the literature, vice versa. Such conclusions support the idea that 
capital flows are driven by the changes in the (demanded and actual) risk premia: I shall return to 
this point in Section 3. While tackling the issue of credit spreads in a way that is very close to the 
one I shall develop in this work, Fiees does not address debt dynamics, which are, instead, part of 
this investigation
4. In addition, he does not include foreign investors’ appetite for risk as one of 
the global factors involved: this, I believe, is something to improve upon.  
  It is also worth considering the contribution by Agenor, Hoffmaister and Medeiros (2002). 
These authors examine the behaviour of the capital flows and the real exchange rate in Brazil 
during the period 1988-1995. They resort to a near-VAR model where capital flows, changes in 
domestic and foreign interest rates, changes in the expected depreciation rate, the government 
spending-output ratio and changes in the real exchange rate are all linked. Using a generalized 
VAR framework (as proposed in Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996), the authors show that the 
impact of a change in the world interest rate explains only a small proportion of fluctuations in 
capital flows. This work is close in spirit to my contribution because it focuses only on one 
country (that is, by coincidence, the same); in addition, Agenor and his co-authors treat foreign 
interest rates as block exogenous, as I will do afterwards. However, since the authors tackle 
capital flows and exchange rate, their contribution can be distinguished from mine in light of two 
of its main features: first, sovereign debt dynamics are not considered, and, second, foreign risk 
aversion is not included among the foreign factors.  
  Since this work started, a few other analyses have dealt with the endogeneity of debt 
dynamics and credit spreads, as well as with the relative importance of foreign factors. Garcia-
Herrero and Ortiz (2005) empirically assess the relative importance of global factors (such as 
global risk aversion, US interest rates and US economic growth) to explain the evolution of 
                                                 
4 The same observation is valid for Calvo et al. (1993). With respect to Fiees, however, Calvo and co-authors 
explicitly focus on capital flows, real exchange rate fluctuations, and accumulation of international reserves.     
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sovereign credit spreads in Latin America (hereafter LA). They use a small 4 variables SVAR 
model (the actual identification strategy is, in fact, a Choleski decomposition without any block 
exogeneity assumption) to identify the underlying foreign determinants of LA sovereign spreads. 
Following the intuition of the principal component analysis by McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), 
they end up distinguishing a direct and an indirect channel of influence of US growth and long 
term interest rates on LA sovereign spreads
5. Their approach does not encompass domestic LA 
variables and so, interestingly, neither deficit nor debt variables enter the specification of the 
domestic factors affecting credit spreads. Thus, the authors fail to fully take into account the 
endogeneity of credit spreads and debt dynamics. In addition, as mentioned, they do not adopt a 
block exogeneity assumption and produce impulse response functions for the US variables to the 
Brazilian innovations. In this work I will try to improve on this and to test the robustness of their 
findings. 
  Favero and Giavazzi (2005) argue that the way EMBI spreads respond to international 
shocks depends on the fiscal policy regime in force
6. In particular, they find that the correlation 
between  US  BAA  corporate  high  yield  and  EMBI  spreads  is  nonlinear  and  the  nonlinearity 
depends on the state of domestic fiscal policy. They conclude that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy  in  a  country  whose  fiscal  policy  is  judged  as  unsustainable  by  financial  markets,  is 
significantly reduced. Even a serious inflation targeting policy can be at jeopardy and it can, 
under certain circumstances, even turn out to be counterproductive. I shall come back to this issue 
again in Section 3 where I shall illustrate the work of Blanchard (2005), as the assumptions and 
conclusions  in  Favero  and  Giavazzi  (2005)  are  in  line  with  it.  With  respect  to  these  two 
contributions, in this work I focus on and quantify the forecast and historical relative contribution 
of global factors on the fluctuations of several Brazilian domestic variables.   
To conclude this concise review of the literature, it is worth mentioning the recent work 
by Goretti (2005). Using high frequency data, she employs a Markov-Switching regime with 
Gibb sampling model to disentangle the relative importance of several sources of instability (such 
as political factors, global risk aversion, IMF news, and Argentine contagion) in Brazil, during 
the currency and financial distress episode in 2002. As she focuses on a specific episode, the 
investigation covers a rather restricted span of time and offers interesting empirical insights only 
on  the  validity  of  some  interpretations  of  the  Brazilian  turmoil.  The  author  argues  there  is 
evidence in favour of a regime switch, that is a jump in equilibria during this delicate political 
                                                 
5 The indirect channel is the one that refers to the impact that US growth and interest rates have on the global risk 
aversion and, via the latter, on the LA credit spreads. 
6 The latter can be, following Woodford (1994) terminology,  either Ricardian or Non Ricardian.    
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and  economic  period
7.  Credit  spreads  seem  to  be  remarkably  affected  both  by  international 
factors and by the developments of the peculiar political situation in Brazil during 2002 (namely, 
the distinctive features of the candidates to the Presidential elections in October 2002). The main 
policy  implication  one  can  draw  from  this  is  that  developing  countries’  financial  markets, 
currencies and debt instruments are very sensitive to the fluctuations in global risk aversion and 
pre-electoral political instability. Admittedly, this conclusion does not provide general, all-time-
valid suggestions about how to better predict the impact of the individual variables on credit 
spreads. I believe the main contribution of the paper is, rather, in distinguishing and assessing the 
theoretical  explanations  of  what  happened  in  Brazil  on  that  specific  occasion.  In  this  work, 
instead, the emphasis will be placed on the “normal time” links between foreign and domestic, 
macroeconomic and financial variables affecting debt and credit spreads.  
 
3. Credit risk spreads as a channel of transmission. 
 
In  broad  terms,  a  traditional  general  equilibrium  macroeconomic  model  assumes  that 
international investors are risk neutral. This tenet excludes the possibilities of modelling risk 
premia and including the degree of risk aversion among the determinants of the equilibrium. To 
my  knowledge,  the  only  macroeconomic  model  where  credit  spreads  and  the  degree  of  risk 
aversion  are  encompassed  to  explain  the  evolution  of  other  macroeconomic  variables  is 
Blanchard (2005). Blanchard puts forward the idea that foreign investors, being more risk averse 
than domestic investors, demand a risk premium to hold their funds in emerging, risky countries. 
Such a risk premium depends on two main components, that are the investors’ degree of risk 
aversion
8  and  the  probability  that  the  issuer  defaults  on  its  obligations.  As  the  actual  risk 
premium is determined by the average investor’s behaviour, and being foreign investors more 
risk averse than the domestic ones, unexpected changes in the degree of risk aversion of a few 
(either foreign or domestic) investors may cause sudden capital flow reversals. Similarly, abrupt 
changes in the perceived probability of default are able to trigger sudden capital stop (or, vice 
versa, inflows). Changes both in foreign risk aversion and in the probability of default make the 
risk premia required by investors grow beyond the actual premia. Such a gap between the actual 
and the required interest rates leads international investors to withhold their loans until the former 
reaches the latter. The capital reversals, that result as a by-product of this interaction, tend, in 
                                                 
7 It is worth mentioning that the author imposes a regime switch on the constant terms, not on the coefficients of the 
estimated regressions. 
8 In financial jargon, this is also called the investors’ appetite for risk.    
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their  turn,  to  depreciate  the  domestic  currency,  increase  imported  inflation,  and  worsen  debt 
prospects. In such a situation, a peculiar form of fiscal dominance occurs: inflation is spurred by 
the change in the required credit risk premia and not by a lax monetary policy conduct
9. This 
peculiar  channel  of  transmission  of  the  shocks  represents  a  self-enforcing  process:  it  helps 
explaining some economic phenomena that are hard to justify by means of more classical models 
(i.e. models with risk neutral international investors).  
From an analytical point of view, the relationship between the domestic bond yields r and 
the  foreign  risk-free  government  debt  yields  r
f  in  the  presence  of  risk-averse  international 
investors can be written as follows: 
j + + = + + - ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
f r pRV r p  
In this formula, p is the expected probability of default, r is the domestic government bond yields, 
r
f is the risk-free international interest rate, RV is the recovery value after the default and, φ is the 
risk premium demanded by foreign investors. As said, the risk premium φ depends on the foreign 
degree of risk aversion and the probability of default p. The probability of default p depends on a 
large number of domestic and international factors, such as the level of external debt, the conduct 
of domestic monetary and fiscal authorities, the domestic vulnerability to foreign shocks, the 
political  climate,  the  global  liquidity  conditions,  the  intervention  of  the  IMF  (or  its  lack)  in 
temporary  episodes  of  financial  distress,  past  credit  history,  and  the  like.  The  probability  of 
default p, in other words, is endogenous: on the one hand, it changes because of the fluctuations 
in the international (exogenous) lending conditions and in the domestic conditions and, on the 
other hand, it affects the required risk premium and, thus, the equilibrium values of the interest 
rate, the exchange rate and inflation. This creates a complicated equilibrium relationship between 
the foreign degree of risk aversion, the domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and any other 
domestic and foreign shock. It is worth noting that, although this idea may sound familiar and 
almost intuitive, in fact, most macroeconomic models studying debt and default in the literature 
build on the assumption of risk neutral investors and complete markets. In the formula above this 
assumption corresponds to setting the value of  φ equal to 0.  
                                                 
9  I  qualify  this  form  of  fiscal  dominance  as  “peculiar”  because  it  differs  from  the  famous  fiscal  dominance 
phenomenon illustrated by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and developed afterwards by Leeper (1991), and, more in 
general, by the so-called fiscal theory of the price level, first introduced by Woodford (1994), further developed by 
Uribe (2006), and applied to Brazil by Loyo (2000). In a nutshell, the classical dominance theory builds on the idea 
that when the fiscal policy is unrestricted, and debt grows without constraints, the monetary authorities eventually 
have to inflate the debt away, so as to guarantee that the intertemporal budget constraint holds in the long run. The 
“peculiar” fiscal dominance theory illustrated by Blanchard, instead, is based on the channel of transmission linking 
actual and required interest rates, capital flows, exchange rate and inflation.     
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Working on the formula above and leaving φ and p unspecified, the government bonds’ 
spread can be calculated as the difference between the domestic and the foreign risk free rate, that 
is  ] ) 1 ( ][ ) 1 ( [ p p RV r r r spread
f f - - + + = - = j . 
Clearly, the credit spread is a complicated function of the probability of default, the risk premium 
and the international risk-free interest rate. The risk premium is determined by some international 
factors (such as foreign investors’ appetite for risk, global liquidity and global financial distress 
conditions) and also by the perceived probability of default, which is, in turn, influenced by 
domestic and international macroeconomic conditions. Notably, credit spreads affect the cost of 
servicing debt and domestic interest rates; therefore, they influence both the vulnerability of the 
country and the future incentives to default. Since the latter are, as said, an important determinant 
of the credit spreads themselves, it follows that significant current fluctuations of credit spreads 
tend to affect their own evolution in the future. All this suggests that credit spreads are not only 
affected by the shocks hitting most macroeconomic and financial variables, but also affect some 
of them in return. The recognition of this issue indicates that, while studying the interaction 
between  credit  spreads  and  macroeconomic  variables,  it  is  appropriate  to  adopt  a  systemic 
approach.  A  single  equation  approach  (where  credit  spreads  are  the  dependent  variable  and 
external factors the independent ones) fails to take into account the centrality of credit spreads in 
their  own    evolution  and  in  that  of  the  economy.  This  constitutes  the  main  motivation  for 
resorting to a VAR model which encompasses most the of the abovementioned variables.  
Before going to illustrate the empirical model to estimate and the data, I shall make a 
short digression to better qualify the idea proposed by Blanchard, and, in relation to it, the goals 
and scope of my empirical work. As outlined above, the idea that changes in the required risk 
premia may cause inflationary pressures even in a country where monetary policy is conducted in 
an orthodox way has not been much exploited in the past. Such “new” fiscal dominance theory, 
however,  is helpful to explain peculiar economic phenomena that find no clear explanation in the 
traditional  “risk  neutral”  literature.  An  example  of  this  is  represented  by  what  happened  to 
inflation and credit spreads in Brazil in 2002. At the time of the Presidential elections (eventually 
won by Mr. Lula), inflation spiked up despite the central bank maintaining its firm and truthful 
commitment to conduct a tight monetary policy. The fact that a spike in the Brazilian EMBI 
spread  occurred  at  the  same  time  as  that  in  inflation  has  attracted  the  attention  of  many 
economists who have tried to uncover the connections between these phenomena. Although I 
focus  on  this  very  same  country  and  period,  and  will  base  many  choices  and  comments  on 
Blanchard’s intuition, I shall not try to establish here whether such a peculiar form of fiscal    
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dominance occurred in that period in Brazil or not
10. Rather, I intend to show that credit spreads, 
once their endogeneity is taken into account seriously, are extremely important in explaining the 
developments and the fluctuations of the Brazilian economy. In particular, I shall show that the 
degree  of  risk  aversion  of  foreign  investors  is  a  crucial  determinant  of  the  macroeconomic 
volatility in Brazil. Insofar as these conclusions can be generalised to other emerging markets 
holding external debt, some general policy implications can be drawn. While governments and 
central banks can more or less directly affect (and control) the course and the fluctuations of the 
main domestic macroeconomic variables, they cannot influence foreign investors’ degree of risk 
aversion
11. The exogeneity of this important global factor suggests two policy recommendations 
for  emerging  markets.  First,  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  should  follow  with  care  the 
developments in the international appetite for risk, being ready to intervene not to try to influence 
it, but, rather, to moderate the impact of its shocks on the domestic economy. Secondly, while 
assessing the political and economic responsibility of bizarre economic outcomes, domestic and 
foreign observers should use great caution. As it will appear more clearly in what follows, the 
blame for the upsurge of inflation in Brazil in 2002 has been probably thrown too hastily on 
monetary and fiscal authorities, which might indeed have reacted too little and too late, yet do not 
seem to be the origin of such a problematic situation. 
 
4. The data. 
 
According to what argued so far, in order to disentangle the contribution of domestic and 
external  factors  to  the  development  of  the  Brazilian  economy,  I  shall  employ  both  foreign 
variables (i.e. the US industrial production cycle, US Federal Funds Rate, US-BAA corporate 
high yield spread) and Brazilian domestic series (i.e. the inflation rate, the real depreciation of the 
Real  with  respect  to  the  US  dollar,  the  cyclical  component  of  the  industrial  production,  the 
primary deficit cumulated over the 12 months, net external debt over GDP, and the EMBI credit 
                                                 
10 Accordingly, although I shall highlight those results that can be interpreted as supporting the existence of such a 
channel, this is not to be intended as the ultimate goal of the paper. For direct empirical tests, see Blanchard (2005), 
Favero and Giavazzi (2005), Loyo (2005), and Tanner and Ramos (2002).  
11 Admittedly, this general statement is only partially true. In fact, US investors’ appetite for risk could depend (in a 
very small measure) on Brazil’s political, military, and economic conditions. For instance, if US investors were to 
believe that Brazil was going to invade Argentina, US spreads would be certainly affected by Brazil’s conduct. Yet 
there are no events of such a kind in the period of time under consideration. The objection remains however valid for 
those emerging market countries that are able to affect investors’ sentiment worldwide. It is easy to think of the long 
lasting repercussions that events occurring in the Middle East or in Venezuela have on the price of oil and, as a 
consequence, on US investors’ appetite for risk. Similarly, Russian default in 1998 had huge repercussions on US 
monetary policy – as admitted by Chairman Greenspan – and on the international markets (see Dungey et al. 2003); 
events of this kind can hardly be treated as exogenous to the US and US investors.    
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spread
12). Since I will look at the period of time spanning from January 1995 to January 2004, the 
series have been collected over this time lapse. All the data have a monthly frequency. I employ 
Giavazzi and Favero’s dataset (see Giavazzi and Favero (2005))
13 and I add a few series which 
come from the IFS Statistics 2004 and from the Banco Central do Brasil. In this section, I shall 
briefly illustrate the most relevant variables employed in the empirical investigation; in particular, 
I  shall  focus  on  the  EMBI  spread,  the  US-BAA  corporate  high  yield  spread  (BAA  spread 
hereafter),  and  on  Brazilian  external  debt.  Following  the  literature,  I  shall  employ  the  BAA 
spread  as  a  measure  of  the  international  investors’  appetite  for  risk  (or  risk  aversion)
14.  The 
Brazilian EMBI spread (which refers to external dollar-denominated Brady bonds and to other 
non-local currency-denominated bonds), instead, serves as a measure of the Brazilian sovereign 
credit spreads. The ratio of the external debt over the domestic GDP is chosen to account for the 
Brazilian sovereign external liabilities. These three variables are plotted in Figure 1 below
15.  
BAAspreads































Figure 1. US_BAA spread, EMBI spread and external debt (as % of GDP). 
 
                                                 
12 More precisely, the Brazilian inflation rate and the real depreciation rate of the Real with respect to the US dollar 
are  calculated  as  monthly  %  rates  of  change  expressed  in  annual  terms.  The  cyclical  component  of  Brazilian 
industrial production is obtained by HP filtering (with a smoothing parameter set equal to 14400) the Brazilian 
industrial production index. The primary deficit cumulated over the 12 months and the external debt are expressed as 
% ratio over Brazilian GDP. All the interest rates are expressed as hundreds basis points. The reasons for choosing 
these series will be spelt out and discussed in section 5. 
13 The series have been extended where necessary. 
14 Arguably, these spreads depend both on international investors’ risk appetite and on the actual default risk of US 
corporate high yield assets. Nonetheless, being both of them exogenous to Brazil, I will take the shortcut of using 
them as a proxy of international risk appetite tout court. 
15 The vertical lines coincide respectively with the inception of the crisis in Russia (August 1998), the Brazilian 
devaluation (January 1999), the turmoil in Turkey (February 2001), the crisis in Argentina (August 2001), and the 
crisis in Uruguay (May 2003).    
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These three series move in a very similar way over the period of time considered: they fall and 
remain low from 1995 to 1998, rise afterwards ( after the Russian crisis), climb again in 2002 
and, finally, drop at the end of the sample. This common pattern suggests that the series might be 
relatively highly correlated. This similarity is curious in the case of the external debt because its 
evolution  depends  on  a  wider  series  of  factors  –  namely,  fiscal  deficits,  exchange  rate 
fluctuations, interest rates and inflation - which are not plotted in Figure 1. Accordingly, to better 
assess  the  relative  contribution  of  BAA  and  EMBI  spreads  to  the  evolution  of  Brazilian  net 
external debt, a more systematic analysis is warranted and, indeed, this will be one of the main 
goals  pursued  in  sections  5  and  6
16.  Here,  I  shall  continue  with  the  visual  inspection  of  the 
relationship of EMBI  and BAA spreads  with other variables of interest.  In particular, in the 
following figures, I will plot the EMBI and BAA spreads against the US 10 year Treasury bond 
yield, the US Federal Fund Rate (FFR hereafter), and the de-seasonalised domestic  industrial 
production cycle.  
I start presenting two graphs plotting the EMBI and BAA credit spreads, and the US 10 
year Treasury bond yield (US_10y hereafter). The reason for looking at the US_10y is that this 
series is often used in the literature as a proxy of international liquidity. Furthermore, since it 
differs from the short-term FFR, it will be considered in Section 6 to test the robustness of the 
baseline VAR findings. Starting from Figure 2, a pattern characterised by high US_10y (scale on 
the right hand) and low EMBI spreads (scale on the left hand) and a negative correlation between 
the two can be observed. After the first quarter of 2002, the behaviour of the series changes but 
the correlation remains negative
17: the EMBI spread jumps while the US_10 yield falls to an all-
time low. The pattern of the series over 2002 is certainly peculiar and it is likely to depend on the 
contemporaneous presence of the presidential elections in Brazil, on the one hand, and of the 
stock market collapse and the very accommodative US monetary policy in 2001-2002, on the 
                                                 
16 Giavazzi and Favero (2005) discuss the time-varying nature of the correlation between these two credit spreads 
series. They argue that the fiscal policy regime in force affects the impact of foreign shocks on the evolution of the 
EMBI spreads, and this makes the relationship time-varying and nonlinear. Despite acknowledging the possible 
presence of nonlinear relationships, this issue will not be addressed in this work.  
17 It should be noted that, from a theoretical point of view, an increase in US long term government yields may be 
either  positively  or  negatively  correlated  with  the  EMBI  spread.  If  a  portfolio  substitution  effect  prevails,  the 
correlation will be positive. The rationale is that an increase in the US long term yields reduces the amount of funds 
available to emerging markets and increases the spread. On the contrary, if a flight-to-quality effect occurs, any 
major increase in the spread tends to lead to an increased demand for US bonds and a decrease in their yields. 
Accordingly, the correlation between the two is negative. The second channel of transmission is more plausible if the 
movements in the spread are global, not only related to a single country. (Note that, if the capital outflows from an 
individual country are so large as to affect US treasury bond yields, the latter caveat does not apply). This seems to 
be confirmed by the actual negative correlation (-0.35) in the sample and supports the idea that the EMBI spread is 
strongly affected by international investors’ risk aversion.    
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other.  This  hypothesis  seems  corroborated  by  the  spike  in  US_BAA  spread  and  the  drop  in 





















Figure 2. EMBI spread (% left hand scale) and US_10y (% right hand scale). 
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Figure 3. US_BAA spread (% left  hand scale) and US_10y (% right hand scale). 
 
In Figure 4, the EMBI spread and the Federal Fund Rate are plotted. There does not seem to be 
one single relationship between the two series over the whole period
18. Overall, however, their 
correlation  results  negative  (about  -0.36  in  the  whole  sample).  This  could  be  due  to  several 
factors.  For  instance,  falling  levels  of  the  FFR  may  be  associated  with  the  slowing  of  US 
economic activity and, often, to dollar depreciations: these, in turn, are usually transmitted to 
                                                 
18 One could argue that short and long term interest rates are leading indicators of the US cycle and, therefore, that 
this is sufficient to guarantee a negative correlation between the BAA spread and both short and long term interest 
rates. Still, current and prospective inflation seems to play the lion share in the determination of current short term 
interest rates in most developed countries (US included). Also, the current and past US cycle situations play a more 
important role in the determination of short-term interest rates than in long ones. It follows that short and long-term 
interest rates do not necessarily have to exhibit similar relationships with the BAA spread.    
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Brazil via reduced exports, which result in a worsening  of Brazilian growth prospects, debt 
sustainability and, hence, in a rise of risk premia. 
EMBI FFR



















Figure 4.  EMBI spread (%left hand scale) and FFR (% right hand scale). 
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Figure 5. US_BAA spread (%left  hand scale) and FFR (% right hand scale). 
 
To conclude, I plot the EMBI spread and the Brazilian cyclical component of the production 
index in Figure 6. The series seem negatively correlated, as economic logic would indicate. When 
Brazilian production slows down, the debt-GDP ratio tends to grow and this raises the EMBI 
spread. The latter, in turn, increases the cost of servicing the debt, and therefore contributes to 
augmenting  its riskiness, and after a few lags, its level too. This relationship, however, seems to 
hold less clearly in 2002.    
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CYCLEBRADJ ZER EMBI
EMBI& BR_adj_cycle
















Figure 6. Brazilian cycle (%left  hand scale) and EMBI spread (% right hand scale). 
  
Since the visual inspection of the figures above does not permit to draw much more than 
suggestions  about  the  relationships  between  the  Brazilian  EMBI  spread  and  the  international 
factors considered here, they will be the object of a more analytical investigation in the following 
sections.  
To conclude, before moving on to illustrate the model to estimate, it is worth evaluating 
whether  the  mere  inspection  of  the  series  provides  any  evidence  in  favour  of  or  against  the 
abovementioned “new” fiscal dominance channel postulated by Blanchard (2005). Interestingly, 
while the sample correlation of US_BAA spread with US inflation is not significantly different 
from 0 at all leads and lags, the correlation between EMBI spread and Brazilian inflation is 
significantly different from 0 and positive up to 6 lags of the EMBI spread
19. When the sample is 
restricted to the period before the turmoil in 2002, instead, such correlation index turns out to be 
insignificantly different from 0. This change in the correlation over time seems to provide some 
evidence that the “new” fiscal dominance effect à la Blanchard might have actually occurred in 
Brazil in 2002. This is consistent with the idea that it is the EMBI spread-related shocks (namely, 
pure EMBI spread shocks, risk aversion shocks, and liquidity shocks) that remarkably affect the 
Brazilian rate of inflation (through the indirect channel identified by Blanchard and described 
above), and not their level per se
20. In Section 7, I will provide further evidence on this intuition. 
Clearly, this result is just one piece of evidence in favour of this hypothetical channel; however, 
as explicitly stated in Section 3, proving its existence is not the ultimate goal of this work. Here, 
                                                 
19 The results, calculated for the sample employed in the estimation of the VAR model, are available on request. 
20 This is also consistent with Goretti (2005)’s approach and findings for, even in the short period of time considered, 
she models a regime switch to distinguish normal and “abnormal” periods in which peculiar shocks occur.    
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and in the following sections, I shall limit myself to call the attention of the reader to those 
findings which, I believe, either support or contradict this appealing theory. 
 
5.  The  VAR  model,  the  estimation  technique  and  the  minimal 
identifying assumptions. 
 
In Section 3, I illustrated the reasons why credit spreads should be treated as endogenous 
variables which both react to the shocks of many macroeconomic and financial determinants and 
also affect some of them in return. This requires that a systemic approach be used when studying 
the interaction between credit spreads and macroeconomic variables. Accordingly, I resort to a 
VAR system to study the relative contribution of external and internal variables to the volatility 
of macroeconomic and debt-related variables in Brazil. 
As pointed out while describing the theoretical underpinnings of this empirical work, in 
order to properly determine how external and internal macroeconomic variables influence the 
external debt and credit risk premia in Brazil, it is important to encompass as many relevant 
variables as possible. In order to do so, I shall consider in the VAR both foreign variables – i.e. 
US industrial production cycle, US FFR, US_BAA spread - and Brazilian domestic variables – 
i.e. the Brazilian inflation rate, the real depreciation of the Real with respect to US dollar, the 
cyclical component of the Brazilian industrial production, the primary deficit cumulated over the 
12 months, the level of external debt, and the EMBI spread
21. The period under scrutiny goes 
from January 1995 to January 2004, and the series have a monthly frequency.  
Arguably, in addition to six such domestic variables, it would have been plausible to 
include  either  other  sources  of  macroeconomic  volatility,  or  trade  related  variables,  or  even 
measures of capital flows. However, having only 9 years of monthly observations at disposal, six 
domestic variables represent a relatively large number and it would not be advisable to further 
enlarge the list. Moreover, it is quite difficult to drop most of the chosen series without cutting 
the linkages of the empirical estimation from the theoretical underpinnings illustrated in Section 
3: first, EMBI spread, external debt and inflation are the main variables of interest; second, the 
cycle  and  exchange  rate  depreciations  are  crucial  ingredients  in  the  channel  of  transmission 
suggested  by  Blanchard;  and,  finally,  the  primary  deficit  is  an  important  determinant  of  the 
dynamics of debt. In Section 6, as tests of robustness, I shall estimate a VAR model after having 
                                                 
21  The  data  are  described  in  greater  detail  in  Section  4.  Following  most  of  the  authors  who  have  investigated 
Brazilian economic policy, I employ the net external debt and the primary fiscal deficit cumulated over the last 12 
month.  (See, among the others, Goldfajn (2002 pp.11-12), Favero and Giavazzi (2005))    
  19 
replaced two of the abovementioned variables with another relevant domestic factor, namely the 
Brazilian short-term interest rate (i.e. the Selic). As the results of this modified model are not 
significantly different from those obtained by the VAR specification described in this section, I 
shall come back to this only in Section 6. 
As said, this work aims at finding the relative (forecast and historical) contribution of 
external  global  factors  to  the  fluctuations  of  Brazilian  series,  in  particular  debt  and  country 
spreads (see Section 2). The issue to address is how to properly disentangle the impact of the 
external factors from that of the domestic ones. In order to tackle this problem, the strategy I 
choose is to encompass (some of) the foreign variables which affect, but are not affected by, the 
domestic ones. As anticipated in the previous sections, I implicitly assume that the considered US 
variables proxy such unobservable global factors. Although it is a shortcut, this solution is widely 
adopted in the literature, given the central role played by the US dollar and US investors in the 
international financial markets. Arguably, there is a long list of US nominal and real variables 
standing  as  possible  candidates,  namely  US  inflation,  US_FFR,  US  GDP  growth,  US_BAA 
spread, US industrial production cyclical component, and the like. In order to keep the number of 
variables to a treatable level, I include only three of them, namely US deseasonalised industrial 
production cycle (US_cycle), US FFR (or, alternatively, US 10 year Treasury bond yield), and 
US_BAA spread. The choice of these variables is driven by economic reasoning: i) the FFR 
provides the basis rate, on the top of which a risk premium is to be added in foreign (less safe) 
countries
22, ii) the US_cycle is an important determinant of US trade patterns and affects both the 
US_BAA spread and the short-term interest rate, and iii) the US_BAA spread provides a good 
measure of global risk aversion (or appetite for risk)
23. All these variables are truly exogenous 
from  the  Brazilian  viewpoint  and,  therefore,  respect  the  necessary  requirements  to  be 
encompassed as block exogenous in the VAR model to estimate.  
Since this modelling choice is at the heart of this empirical investigation, it requires a few 
comments. As the US is an integrated financial centre and a big economy (in the usual meaning 
economists use the expression “big country”), it is rather unlikely that Brazilian macroeconomic 
conditions can significantly affect the Fed’s decisions and private investors’ appetite for risk. It 
follows that assuming US_cycle, US_FFR and US_BAA spread to be block exogenous is, to say 
                                                 
22 In addition, embedding the FFR helps determine how the Brazilian economy reacts to changes in the monetary 
conditions in the US. 
23 See Blanchard (2005 p.63) as to the use of the US_BAA spread as a proxy of global risk aversion. Dungey et al. 
(2003) study the relative importance of three different components of global risk, that is liquidity, volatility and 
credit shocks. Admittedly, the US_BAA spread reflects only credit shocks; however, as pointed out by Dungey et al. 
(2003 pp. 20-21) these are the most relevant innovations in Brazil.     
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the  least,  a  plausible  presumption
24,25.  While  this  presumption  is  not  too  demanding,  its 
implications  on  the  estimation  are  noteworthy.  First,  since  imposing  a  block  exogeneity 
restriction  on  the  foreign  variables  is  equivalent  to  assuming  that  neither  current  nor  lagged 
values of domestic Brazilian variables affect the US ones, the number of parameters to estimate 
(and the complexity of the impulse response functions) are reduced
26,27. Second, it permits a 
reasonable causal ordering of  foreign  and domestic variables. Third, it  allows looking at the 
historical contribution of foreign shocks to the variance of domestic variables (see next section) 
without having to identify each and every individual shock. This latter is the advantage of this 
(relatively simple) technique with respect to those methods which ground their conclusions on the 
relative contribution of internal and external factors on a specific identification strategy for the 
entire VAR model.  
In order to take into account seasonal patterns and peculiar periods of time within the span 
1995:01-2004:01, I add a number of deterministic components to the analysis. I include a set of 
monthly dummies and 2 other dummies
28. The first dummy takes value one in the period of 
Russian debt crises (August to December 1998). The second dummy takes value one in the three 
months  after  Brazilian  authorities  de-pegged  the  Real  from  the  US  Dollar  and  the  currency 
officially started floating (January – March 1999). In this period, the Brazilian exchange rate 
market went through a serious turmoil
29. Finally, I encompass also 2 lags of the US inflation rate 
                                                 
24 See footnote 11 for a minor caveat to this assumption. 
25 Note that block exogeneity is stronger than block causality. A block causality restriction in a VAR system is a 
mere generalization of a Granger causality restriction; a variable does not Granger cause another variable if lagged 
values of the former do not significantly affect current values of the latter. This restriction still allows the former 
variable to contemporaneously affect the second one. Similarly, in a VAR framework, block causality imposes that 
past values of a group of variables do not affect current values of another group.  Block exogeneity in a VAR system, 
instead, implies that both current and past values of a group of  variables do not affect current values of another 
group. This is why the variables of the first group are (block) exogenous to the second ones. 
26 This choice basically entails a triangularisation of domestic and foreign variables. It should be noted that once I 
assume the block exogeneity of the foreign variables the VAR system becomes a near-VAR system since not all the 
equations of the model have the same number of regressors. For instance, the equation for the US_BAA spread has 
only lagged values of the FFR and the US_BAAspread, while the EMBI equation encompasses the lagged values of 
all the foreign and the domestic variables. From a theoretical point of view, a gain in efficiency can be obtained using 
a SUR estimation, yet, in practice, SUR and OLS estimations provide almost identical results in this sample. 
27 See Genberg (2003) and Genberg, Salemi and Swoboda (1987) as valuable references on the technical details 
regarding  the  exploitation  of  such  an  assumption  for  identification  purposes.  Chusman  and  Zha  (1997)  offer  a 
different application of the same techniques.   
28 I do not include either a dummy for controlling for the Real Plan for its implementation goes back to July 1994 
(that is 6 months before the beginning of the sample under scrutiny), or dummies in correspondence to international 
financial  turmoil,  other  than  the  Russian  crisis  and  the  Brazilian  distress.  The  latter  have  turned  out  to  be 
insignificant in some preliminary estimations including them.  
29 The dates chosen are an approximation of the real timing of the crises. For purposes of the estimation, they do not 
strictly coincide with the anecdotal public information disclosure for some movements occur both earlier than and 
after the announcements of the beginning and the end of a crisis. Dungey et al. (2003) operate a similar cautious 
choice.    
  21 
in the equation of the FFR. This improves the fit of the model, since it mimics the classical 
Taylor type rule which fits well the broad contours of US monetary policy
30.  
Given the relatively limited number of observations (108) and their monthly frequency, 
tests  for  the  presence  of  unit  roots  in  the  series  are  not  fully  reliable.  While  neglecting  the 
possible presence of unit roots in the series risks undermining a single equation estimation, a 
VAR  system  is  less  sensitive  to  the  such  a  problem  because  near  unit-roots  VARs  produce, 
anyway,  consistent  estimates.  Several  authors  suggest  concentrating  on  the  estimation  stage 
without questioning the stationarity of the series (see Enders (2003) p.301, Garcia and Rigobon 
2004 p.10. For a detailed analysis, see Rothenberg and Stock (1997)). I follow such an indication 
and estimate the model with the series as described earlier.  
The structural model looks like the second-order system
31 below: 
t t t t Cz y L y e + + B = A -1 ) (                (1). 
yt    is  the  vector  of  foreign  and  domestic  variables  at  time  t  (namely:  US_cycle,  US  FFR, 
US_BAA  spread,  Brazilian  cycle,  Brazilian  primary  deficit,  real  depreciation  of  the  Real,  
Brazilian inflation rate, external debt (as % of GDP), and Brazilian EMBI spread). The matrix A 
represents the structure of simultaneous determination in the economy, B(L) is the matrix of the 
parameters for the lagged values of the variables, zt is a vector of other exogenous variables 
(namely 1 constant, 11 seasonal dummies, 2 dummies for the Russian and the Brazilian turmoil, 
and 2 lags of US inflation which enter only in the equation of the US FFR) and εt is the vector of 
the  innovations,  assumed  to  be  independent  and  normally  distributed  with  mean  zero  and 
variance  .  The system is block-triangular because the foreign variables are assumed to be block 
exogenous.  To  make  more  evident  the  implications  of  this  assumption,  system  (1)  can  be 
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t are the foreign and domestic structural innovations.  
 The model to estimate is the reduced form of (1) and (2). This takes the typical VAR structure: 
t t t t u Fz y L D y + + = -1 ) (                 (3) 
                                                 
30 Estimating a Taylor rule for the US by adopting monthly observations usually leads to estimated coefficients that 
are very different from those obtained with quarterly series. Nonetheless, the rule encompassed in this VAR has a 
discrete fit and behaves quite satisfactorily, probably because of the 2 recursive components.  
31 The estimated VAR system encompasses 2 lags of all variables,  as suggested by AIC and SIC indices.  
32 In what follows I draw on Genberg (2003) and Genberg et al (1987).    
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where D(L) is the matrix of propagation of the shocks, and ut is the vector of the reduced-formed 
residuals. It is worth making explicit that D(L)=A
-1B(L), F=A
-1C, and ut= A
-1εt. By construction, 
the  residuals  ut  are  correlated  according  to  the  characteristics  of  matrix  A
-1.  Because  of  this 
correlation,  the  residuals  of  each  estimated  equation  cannot  be  treated  as  independent 
innovations. In order to show that block triangularisation of A and B(L) is maintained also in the 
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After having estimated the reduced form of system (4)
33, it is possible to perform a series of 
experiments, such as deriving the forecast error variance decompositions, the impulse response 
functions (IRFs hereafter) of the endogenous variables to the various shocks affecting the system, 
and  the  historical  decomposition  of  the  endogenous  variables.  All  these  procedures  require 
disentangling  the  feedbacks  inherent  in  the  system  and,  therefore,  adopting  an  identification  
strategy  for  the  whole  system.  Unfortunately,  any  identification  strategy  is  questionable  and 
controversial, and it leads to conclusions conditional on the identifying assumptions
34. Bearing 
this in mind, in Section 7, I shall propose an identification strategy for the whole system, and 
provide and discuss the relative impulse response functions. This exercise, however, is not the 
main goal of this work. In fact, as anticipated earlier, I estimate this VAR system to recover 
information mainly about two aspects. First, I am interested in the relative contribution of foreign 
variables to the forecast volatility of the Brazilian domestic macroeconomic variables. Second, I 
calculate the relative historical contribution of global factors on the actual behaviour of external 
debt and EMBI credit spread over a specific period of time, namely January 2001- January 2004. 
Achieving these two objectives does not require endorsing any specific identification strategy on 
the interaction between the domestic Brazilian variables, but only a block exogeneity assumption 
for  the  foreign  global  factors.  As  said,  this  assumption  is  not  too  demanding  and  allows 
                                                 
33 I report the results of the estimation in Appendix C. 
34 To understand why, it must be remembered that economists resort to VAR systems in order to overcome the 
problem of simultaneity between the endogenous variables of interest. Being unable to decide on theoretical grounds 
about the exact contemporaneous interaction between the variables, it is convenient to estimate reduced-form models 
(i.e. autoregressive representations of the system) that i) are free from the simultaneity problem, and, usually, ii) fit 
the  data  well.  To  develop  forecast  error  variance  decompositions,  impulse  response  functions,  and  historical 
decompositions, however, an identification strategy needs be chosen, that is a set of restrictions on the way the 
variables are supposed to interact. It is clear how controversial this technique intrinsically is. The problem to solve is 
the lack of certain knowledge on the contemporaneous relationships between the variables, and the solution (i.e. the 
identification strategy) consists in imposing subjective, a priori restrictions on their interaction. Any solution of this 
kind is subject to some criticism. Nonetheless, an identification strategy requires imposing only N(N-1)/2 restrictions 
in order to obtain the estimates of N
2 contemporaneous coefficients (where N is the number of endogenous variables 
in the VAR system). This entails that identifying a VAR system does not require imposing restrictions on all the 
contemporaneous interactions under scrutiny, but, rather, on few of them.     
  23 
distinguishing the contributions of external and internal factors, without imposing any a priori 
restriction on the rest of the model
35.  
 
5.1 The block exogeneity assumption and the contribution of foreign factors to 
the volatility of the domestic Brazilian series. 
 
The relative importance of the foreign variables for the forecast error  variance of the 
domestic Brazilian variables and the historical contribution of the former to the development of 
the  latter  can  be  investigated  by  exploiting  the  block  exogeneity  restriction  on  the  foreign 
variables.  Once such an assumption is imposed on the system, the structure of the residuals can 
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The formula above shows that the disturbances of the foreign block (i.e. u
f
t) are  exclusively 
determined by the structural innovations of the foreign variables, without having to identify the 
whole system. The internal and external contribution to the volatility of the Brazilian series can 
be calculated simply assuming that US_cycle, US_FFR and BAA spread are block exogenous.  
It could be argued that US_cycle, US_FFR and BAA spread could have been embedded in 
the deterministic vector zt and not included as block exogenous variables in the VAR system. In 
fact, having them in the recursive part of the near-VAR allows encompassing their dynamics in 
the determination of the evolution of the whole system: this would not have been possible if they 
had been included in zt rather than in yt.  In subsection 5.4,  I shall consider a case in which 
US_BAA  spread  is  encompassed  as  a  deterministic  factor.  By  comparing  these  diverse 
specifications, I shall point out the implications of including such variables in the model. This 
will help grasping the importance and the novelty of this work, that is the inclusion of both 
domestic and foreign credit spreads in the VAR system.  
 
5.2 The contribution of foreign factors to the forecast error variance of the 
domestic Brazilian variables. 
 
 
In this subsection, I shall focus on the contribution of global factors to the forecast error 
variance  of  the  Brazilian  variables  of  interest
36.  The  block  exogeneity  assumption  allows 
distinguishing the source of the forecast fluctuations of the domestic variables at different time 
                                                 
35 The lack of an identification strategy for the whole system prevents from discriminating the relative contribution of 
each  individual  factor  to  the  volatility  of  the  others.  This  is  the  inherent  limitation  of  the  block  exogeneity 
assumption. 
36 In general, the FEV decomposition shows how much of the unanticipated changes of variables are explained by 
different shocks.    
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horizons.  On  the  basis  of  the  forecast  error  variance  decomposition,  the  contribution  of  the 
foreign factors at different horizons is reported in Table 1. 
 













1  3.31  3.79  0.61  3.47  17.78  31.56 
3  18.68  7.43  9.29  9.14  35.28  36.31 
6  22.84  12.35  10.76  18.82  47.45  43.52 
9  23.30  20.17  11.52  25.13  56.68  48.94 
12  25.17  27.81  11.83  29.38  63.51  52.91 
16  28.53  36.59  11.98  32.64  69.89  56.25 
24  33.57  49.31  12.17  35.28  77.27  59.15 
Table 1. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of Brazilian domestic variables. 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US_BAA spread and US_FFR. 
 
Table  1  shows  that  the  longer  the  horizon,  the  more  important  foreign  variables  are  for  the 
unanticipated  volatility  of  inflation,  primary  deficit-gdp  ratio,  external  debt-gdp  ratio,  EMBI 
spreads, and cyclical component of the industrial  production. The real depreciation of the Real is 
less sensitive to foreign shocks. Overall, the impact of foreign variables on the credit risk spread 
is  notable.  Even  at  very  short  horizons,  almost  one  third  of  the  EMBI  forecast  variation  is 
amenable to foreign shocks. In the long run, this ratio goes up to two-thirds. This finding is very 
much in line with the idea that unexpected shocks to global factors matter a lot to the evolution of 
credit risk premia, both in the short and in the long run. To return to the theory outlined in 
Section 3, these outcomes support the claim that credit risk premia do depend on the evolution of 
domestic variables, but are also importantly affected by changes in global factors, such as foreign 
short-term interest rates and  global risk  aversion.  It follows that, if one wants to understand 
emerging market economies, it is crucial to take into account the impact that global factors have 
on the various domestic macroeconomic and financial variables. The proportion of unexpected 
debt fluctuations which are amenable to foreign shocks is noticeable; the policy implication of 
this  finding  is  that  fiscal  and  monetary  policymakers  should  remain  vigilant  and  actively 
counteract unexpected changes in foreign factors if determined to maintain the evolution of debt 
under control
37.   
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that external factors seem to matter to the volatility of 
inflation; the impact is indeed important even after few lags. Although this finding does not 
                                                 
37 This is in line with the conclusions Canova draws from the analysis on a group of LA countries.(2005 p. 231).     
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inform about how much external shocks actually affected Brazilian inflation in the period under 
scrutiny, it confirms that it would be erroneous not to take them into account while judging the 
overall performance of monetary authorities. In fact, this is exactly what a certain number of 
economists, some sections of the press and politicians did after inflation spiked in 2002. 
 
5.2.1 A note of caution on the methodology. 
The estimated contribution of foreign shocks to the forecast variance of Brazilian series is 
striking. To assess such findings properly, I believe that some caution is warranted and a few 
additional considerations are in order. An important technicality to have in mind is that the block 
exogeneity assumption entails that the exogenous variables Granger-cause the endogenous ones. 
Accordingly,  any  change  to  the  domestic  Brazilian  variables  that  is  potentially  (directly  and 
indirectly) amenable to foreign shocks is accounted for in the contribution of foreign factors. 
Under certain circumstances, the risk is over-estimating the impact of the latter on the former. 
Imagine, for instance, that two contemporaneous, similar, but independent, shocks hit the EMBI 
and  the  US_BAA  spreads.  (As  an  example,  the  shock  to  the  US_BAA  spread  could  be  an 
increase in the riskiness of US corporate bonds and not a shock to the degree of global risk 
aversion.) In a VAR model like this one, the impact of the Brazilian-specific shock (simultaneous 
to  the  US  one)  would  be  partially  (and  erroneously)  attributed  to  the  latter.  Evaluating  the 
importance of such a caveat in this analysis is counterfactual: nonetheless, I shall offer a few 
considerations in which I argue the results do not suffer much. The first consideration is that it is 
very  unlikely  that  many  shocks  occur  simultaneously  in  the  whole  sample  without  being 
correlated. Moreover, the contribution of foreign variables to the fluctuations of domestic series 
varies remarkably across the latter and the different magnitudes follow economic intuition.  
Admittedly, it could be contended that while the absence of an identification scheme does 
not condition the results, the latter are in fact conditioned by its lack. For instance, had it been 
possible  to  find  an  uncontroversial  identification  strategy  restricting  the  impact  of  foreign 
variables  on  only  some  of  the  domestic  ones  so  as  to  reproduce  the  actual  channels  of 
transmission in Brazil, the results might have been slightly different. Unfortunately, however, an 
uncontroversial identification strategy is not available. 
These two considerations show that the pros and cons of imposing a block exogeneity 
assumption (instead of a more structured identification strategy) are subtle. On the one hand, 
imposing a block exogeneity restriction provides a certain degree of generality to the results and 
makes the findings less subject to the criticisms regarding the identification strategy. On the other 
hand, avoiding imposing specific restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation of all foreign    
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and domestic variables might lead to over-estimating the actual contribution of the foreign factors 
to the fluctuations of some of the domestic ones.  
 
5.3 The historical decomposition of the Brazilian domestic variables. 
 
By exclusively imposing the block exogeneity assumption on the foreign factors, it is 
possible  to  decompose  the  ‘historical  values  of  a  set  series  into  a  base  projection  and  the 
accumulated effects of current and past innovations’ (Rats User’s Guide p.307). This exercise 
allows  using  the  residuals  from  the  VAR  estimation  to  obtain  the  structural  shocks  and 
reconstruct their impact on the actual paths of the variables in the system. In this section I shall 
focus on the Brazilian EMBI spread, the net external debt ratio, and inflation. Notice that, while 
in subsection 5.2 I show how the forecast error variance of such variables is affected (ceteris 
paribus) by the innovations in the foreign variables, here, by means of a historical decomposition 
of the VAR residuals, I analyse the relative importance of such global factors for the domestic 
variables in a specific period of time. Since a historical decomposition analysis must refer to a 
period of time that is shorter than the total length of the sample of observations, I choose to 
concentrate on the period from January 2001 to January 2004. The reason is that I want the base 
projection to start prior the turmoil and the Presidential elections in 2002, which characterise the 
period under scrutiny and motivate its choice. 
Below, I report the graphs of the historical decomposition of EMBI spread, external debt 
and inflation
38. The solid line is the actual series of data, the long dashed (LD) line is the base 
projection from January 2001 to January 2004, and the short dashed (SD) line is the sum of the 
base projection and the impact of foreign innovations on the Brazilian domestic variables. The 
inspection of Figures 7 to 10 reveals that much of the difference between the actual series and the 
base projection is indeed conducible to foreign shocks. These results go hand in hand with the 
forecast error variance decompositions in subsection 5.2, and strongly support the idea that global 
factors were important for the actual evolution of the Brazilian economy in those years. 
Looking at Figure 7 for the EMBI spread, it can be noticed that the difference between the 
solid and the SD lines is very narrow, if compared to that between the solid and the LD line. This 
suggests that, between January 2001 and January 2004, most of the difference between actual 
data and the base forecast is due to foreign shocks. Accordingly, global factors seem to have 
played a really important part in leading the ups and downs of the Brazilian EMBI spread.  
                                                 
38 The graphs for all the other variables are available on request.     
  27 
EMBI Forecast Forecast & forei
historical decomposition of Embi
J FMAMJ J ASOND J FMAMJ J ASOND J FMAMJ J ASOND J FMAMJ J ASOND J FMAMJ J ASOND J











Figure 7. The historical decomposition of EMBI. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
 
As revealed in Figures 8 and 9, similar considerations can be drawn for Brazilian external 
debt and inflation. In the case of external debt, the SD line gets very close to the solid one while 
the LD one is far from it in 2002. This suggests that most of the fluctuations in the external debt 
to GDP ratio in that period can be imputed to unexpected innovations to foreign factors: fiscal 
policy seems not to have promptly changed so as to limit the growth of debt. In the case of 
inflation, while the relative weight of foreign shocks is much smaller than in the previous two 
cases, it is apparent that, particularly in mid-2002, the role of foreign shocks is considerable. This 
seems another piece of evidence in favour of the idea that the impact of global factors on inflation 
is significantly large once US_BAA and EMBI spreads are encompassed in the system.  
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Figure 8. The historical decomposition of the external debt over GDP. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
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Figure 9. The historical decomposition of the inflation rate. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
 
Although it is not the focus of the investigation, it is worth showing the historical decomposition 
also  for  the  primary  deficit,  reported  in  Figure  10.  As  can  be  noticed,  it  is  only  taking  into 
account  foreign  factors  that  one  is  able  to  produce  predictions  that  are  closer  to  the  actual 
behaviour of the primary deficit. The base projection alone is, in fact, far from actual data. This 
suggests that the fiscal authorities did not take into account the potential influence of innovations 
in the global factors and this worsened the surplus which otherwise would have been achieved: 
this implies that the fiscal policy stance should be modelled so as to promptly react to foreign 
factors and, in particular, to changes in the appetite for risk.  
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Figure 10. The historical decomposition of the primary deficit. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
 
 As mentioned above, this work aims to show that i) the endogeneity of  credit risk premia and ii) 
the  inclusion  of  (a  measure  of)  global  appetite  for  risk  among  the  explanatory  variables  of 
emerging  market  credit  spreads  are  important  features  that  a  model  directed  to  capture  the    
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macroeconomic and financial dynamics should present. The results presented in this sub-section 
provide, at least for Brazil, some evidence in favour of this hypothesis. 
 
5.4 Assessing the importance of including the BAA spread in the VAR system. 
 
The historical decomposition exercise allows grasping quite easily the relative importance 
of foreign shocks in the actual path followed by domestic variables: one need only compare the 
difference between the base projection and the base projection plus the impact of foreign shocks. 
In particular, an intuitive way to assess the importance of the BAA spread is to compare the 
results above with those that would have been obtained by omitting the BAA spread from the 
system. In Table 2, I report the relative importance of the (remaining) foreign variables in the 
FEV decomposition once the BAA spread variable is omitted. 
Table 2 shows that the impact of foreign variables is modest once the BAA spread is excluded 
from the VAR. In particular, note that the impact of foreign shocks on i) the variance of Brazilian 
inflation is reduced to 10%, and on ii) the variance of the EMBI spread falls to 27%. The forecast 
variance of the external debt remains, in the long run, affected by the shocks to the included 
foreign variables, yet just up to 30%. This outcome suggests that the shocks to the BAA spread 
have a relatively large influence on the volatility of Brazilian variables, and, in particular, on that 
of EMBI spread, debt and inflation; its inclusion, I believe, is crucial in exercises whose objective 
is to disentangle the contributions of external and  internal factors to the volatility of an economy. 








debt  EMBI 
1  1.07  2.24  0.20  0.20  1.43  2.35 
3  4.14  6.60  3.42  6.02  2.31  3.04 
6  6.67  5.24  4.24  9.26  1.33  2.55 
9  8.39  3.31  4.42  9.93  2.76  4.51 
12  9.78  2.52  4.52  10.54  6.25  8.96 
16  11.00  2.89  4.66  10.90  12.78  15.89 
24  11.55  7.99  4.92  11.00  28.73  27.63 
Table 2. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle and US_FFR. US_BAA spread is excluded. 
 
Figures 11 to 13 reproduce the historical decomposition of the Brazilian series obtained from 
estimating a near VAR system where the BAA spread is omitted,  and US_cyle and US_FFR are 
the only foreign variables included.    
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Figure 11. The historical decomposition of the EMBI spread. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
Note: US_BAA spread is excluded from the system. 
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Figure 12. The historical decomposition of the external debt over GDP. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
 Note: US_BAA spread is excluded from the system. 
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Figure 13. The historical decomposition of the inflation rate. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
 Note: US_BBA spread is excluded from the system. 
 
From the comparison of Figures 7, 8 and 9, with 11, 12 and 13, two considerations can be 
made. First, the base projection realized with the VAR system without the BAA spread is worse 
than that obtained with the BAA spread among the variables. Second, foreign shocks appear far 
less important when the BAA spread is omitted than when it is included. The reason for these two    
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results  is,  probably,  that  when  the  BAA  spread  is  excluded,  the  EMBI  spread  moves 
autonomously;  on  the  contrary,  when  the  BAA  spread  enters  the  model,  the  EMBI  spread 
strongly depends on the evolution of the former. This is the misspecification error one would 
commit by omitting a measure of global risk aversion from the model. Put another way, when the 
BAA  spread  is  left  out,  all  the  shocks  hitting  the  EMBI  spread  are  treated  as  idiosyncratic; 
instead,  when  the  BAA  spread  is  included,  global  shocks  to  the  appetite  for  risk  can  be 
distinguished from idiosyncratic Brazilian shocks to the EMBI spread. Furthermore, Figure 13 
corroborates the hypothesis that the BAA spread shocks had a relatively large impact on the 
volatility of Brazilian inflation in 2002; most probably, this happened through the theoretical 
channel identified by Blanchard. I do not claim this amounts to proof that this channel exists and 
mattered  in  that  period;  but  this  appears  to  be,  nonetheless,  an  additional  piece  of  empirical 
evidence in its favour. 
  Admittedly, omitting the BAA spread from the VAR system is an extreme choice. It could 
be argued this is not the most appropriate solution to assess the importance of encompassing it in 
a larger VAR system. For instance, it is reasonable to consider an alternative system where the 
BAA spread is in fact included, but treated as a purely deterministic component. It becomes 
possible then to compare (on a pairwise basis) the results of the VAR models where the BAA 
spread is i) treated as an endogenous variable (subsection 5.1), ii) included as an exogenous 
factor (this subsection, below), and iii) excluded (this subsection, above). Such a comparison 
could  help  shedding  some  light  on  both  of  the  issues  at  the  core  of  this  analysis:  i.e.  the 
endogeneity of credit spreads and the importance of global appetite for risk to emerging markets’ 
domestic fluctuations.  
In a nutshell, encompassing the BAA spread as a deterministic variable importantly changes the 
outcomes  of  the  estimation,  the  FEV  analysis  and  the  historical  decomposition.  The  relative 
contribution of foreign factors in the variance decomposition is reported in Table 3 below. The 
values in Table 3 fall, in general, between those in Tables 1 and 2. The impact of the two foreign 
variables on the variance of the domestic Brazilian series is, in 4 out of 6 cases, around 20%. The 
reason why the insertion of the BAA spread among the deterministic factors increases the relative 
importance of foreign factors in the FEV analysis is, I believe, that the estimated innovations of 
the  EMBI  spread  get  smaller  once  the  BAA  spread  is  included,  even  though  only  as  a 
deterministic term. The logic is the same as that illustrated above. When the BAA spread enters 
the estimation as a deterministic factor, it a) improves the base projection (as can be seen in the 
historical decomposition graphs) and b) slightly reduces the estimated idiosyncratic innovations 
of the EMBI spread.     
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debt  EMBI 
1  2.03  1.23  0.58  1.88  0.38  3.78 
3  16.94  5.57  3.08  6.13  6.31  9.55 
6  18.39  7.52  3.70  15.89  7.25  11.81 
9  18.39  7.00  3.95  18.85  7.85  13.61 
12  19.59  5.83  3.98  20.25  10.53  16.59 
16  21.37  4.93  4.00  21.17  14.39  19.24 
24  22.80  4.83  4.20  22.01  18.52  20.56 
Table 3. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle and US_FFR. US_BAA spread is included as deterministic. 
 
Figures 14 to 16, below, are drawn by encompassing the BAA spread in the VAR model as a 
deterministic factor. The base projection improves considerably with respect to that reproduced in 
Figures 11 to 13 (when the BAA spread is completely excluded). The relative contribution of the 
two remaining foreign shocks has relatively minor importance. It can be concluded that the BAA 
spreads  has  here  only  a  level  effect  on  the  Brazilian  variables  (in  particular,  EMBI  spread, 
external  debt,  and  inflation)  and,  therefore,  that  this  specification  misses  the  fact  that  the 
innovations to  the BAA spread remarkably influence the behaviour of the Brazilian series. 
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Figure 14. The historical decomposition of the EMBI spread. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle and US_FFR. US_BAA spread is included as deterministic. 
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Figura 15. The historical decomposition of the external debt over GDP. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle and US_FFR. US_BAA spread is included as deterministic. 
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Figure 16. The historical decomposition of the inflation rate. 2001:01 – 2004:01 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle and US_FFR. US_BAA spread is included as deterministic. 
 
Admittedly, any comparison between these three series of graphs has to be made with 
caution. Being built on the basis of different assumptions, the models necessarily differ in their 
predicting performance, and the decomposition of the historical series varies accordingly. The 
interpretation  I  propose  above  takes  this  consideration  into  account  and,  I  believe,  is  quite 
conservative. Rather than stressing the exact quantitative results I come up with, I limit myself to 
highlight that both VAR models where a measure of global risk aversion is excluded or included, 
but not endogenised, do not allow to fully grasp the importance of global factors in the dynamics 
of credit risk spreads, external debt and inflation. This is an important finding and distinguishes 
this work from those empirical contributions studying credit spreads and debt by means of single 
equations with few (global and domestic) determinants, all treated as exogenous. 
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6. Alternative specifications: testing the robustness of these findings. 
Before proceeding to the proposal of an identification strategy for the whole system and 
producing the resultant IRFs, I devote this section to some modifications of the model considered 
earlier
39. These serve as tests for the robustness of the previous findings, and, also, enlarge the 
scope of the investigation. 
The first extension I analyse consists in swapping the US_FFR with the US_10y. Long 
term  yields  tend  to  reflect  both  liquidity  in  the  market  and,  according  to  the  expectation 
hypothesis, the expected changes in monetary policy over the medium/long term horizon. Since 
the results of this extension follow those presented earlier, for the sake of brevity, I shall limit the 
discussion to their main differences. The  contribution of foreign  factors to the forecast  error 
variances  of  the  domestic  variables  are  reported  in  Table  4  below,  while  the  historical 
decomposition of these series is plotted in the composite Figure 17.  
 








debt  EMBI 
1  1.09  2.38  0.04  2.01  16.78  31.47 
3  8.07  6.90  7.12  11.77  33.20  33.25 
6  15.10  9.13  8.79  11.76  44.14  40.79 
9  18.32  16.65  9.82  14.83  54.66  48.70 
12  20.51  25.75  10.39  19.64  62.79  54.49 
16  22.99  37.52  10.78  25.08  70.26  59.12 
24  27.39  55.29  11.14  31.15  78.46  63.04 
Table 4. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US 10y and  US_BAA spread. 
 
The relative contributions of foreign factors are not too different from those in Table 1, and the 
interpretation does not change either. Only two differences, in fact, deserve being mentioned: 
these concern the growth in the relative importance of foreign factors in the decomposition of the 
forecast volatility of the EMBI spread and the primary deficit. The first finding is probably due to 
                                                 
39 In Appendix A I reduce the model to a very small scale and repeat the same exercises carried out above. Since this 
extension is undertaken exclusively to test the robustness of these findings it is used a smaller VAR model that 
continues to encompass the main features introduced in this work, I will skip commenting the results here. It suffices 
to say that the main abovementioned conclusions are robust also to this extension.  
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the fact that the US_10y seems to be more strongly negatively correlated to the EMBI spread than 
the FFR, in particular in the years preceding 1999
40.  
The second extension stems from the contention that monthly primary fiscal deficit is not 
too important a domestic variable and needs not be included. Although, on the one hand, the 
performance  of  the  fiscal  authorities  is  constantly  monitored  by  international  investors  and 
institutions,  on  the  other  hand,  monthly  data  do  not  provide  a  sufficiently  broad  and 
comprehensive yardstick of the fiscal policy stance. It is therefore possible that including this 
variable in the VAR system might not improve it. It is worth noticing that this is a plausible 
caveat for attention is focused on external debt, and not on overall (domestic and external) debt. 
According to such reasoning, the primary deficit series is omitted and the results compared with 
those of the baseline model. Since it could be appropriate to encompass in the VAR system the 
Brazilian short run policy interest rate, i.e. the Selic, in what follows I shall replace first the 
primary  deficit  and  then  the  real  depreciation  rate  with  the  Selic  interest  rate.  These  two 
additional extensions serve also to countercheck the robustness of the previous findings
41. 
I start by dropping the primary fiscal deficit and encompassing the Selic interest rate. The 
comparison of Table 5 below with table 1 reveals that the main conclusions do not vary once 
such a change is operated. Foreign factors continue to significantly contribute to the forecast 
variance of the Brazilian domestic variables: nonetheless, the volatility of the Selic seems not to 
be significantly influenced by foreign factors.  
 
 
                                                 
40 What happens in the subsequent period, instead, is more difficult to judge. The change between the periods may be 
due to the fact that the ceteris paribus requirement does not actually hold (because of the depreciation of the Real in 
1999, the adoption of inflation targeting in Brazil, the Presidential elections in 2002, the various crises in Argentina, 
Uruguay and Turkey, and the burst of the US stock market bubble in 2001). However, the change might have also to 
do with the fact that the impact of the US_10y yield on Brazilian long term yields is non linear. I am aware that the 
adoption of a VAR linear estimation technique is implicitly imposing on the coefficients the restriction that they are 
constant over time and state uncontingent. However, the investigation of the possible nonlinearity of the parameters  
goes beyond the goals of this work. Giavazzi and Favero (2005) discuss possible nonlinearity in the relationship 
between EMBI spread and domestic and international factors.  
41 It could be argued that since the foreign variables do not change, it is not surprising that their relative contribution 
to the forecast error variance of the domestic series does not change. The historical decompositions, instead, depend 
on the base projection and on the estimated innovations in the system: both are affected by which variables are 
encompassed.  Historical decomposition : use US_10y instead of US_FFRs
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Figure 17. Historical decomposition of the Brazilian series when US_10y is encompassed in the VAR system. 2001:1 2004:01 
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depreciation  Inflation  Selic 
 External 
debt  EMBI 
1  3.03  0.79 2.84 1.05  18.48  32.71 
3  18.89  9.71 11.28 4.60  34.02  39.51 
6  23.55  10.62 26.87 12.85  43.17  48.67 
9  24.20  11.29 33.50 14.99  58.90  54.16 
12  25.96  11.62 36.54 14.93  58.90  56.98 
16  29.25  11.89 38.10 14.61  64.60  58.52 
24  34.02  12.25 38.70 14.31  69.92  58.20 
Table 5. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US_BAA spread and US_FFR. 
 
The  historical  decomposition  of  the  Brazilian  series  for  this  alternative  model  is  reported  in 
Figure 18. The substitution of the primary deficit with the Selic rate has not significantly changed 
the  results  of  the  exercise.  The  relative  importance  of  foreign  innovations  for  the  historical 
evolution of the EMBI spread, the external debt and the Brazilian inflation is notable. 
A  similar  reasoning  is  also  valid  for  the  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate. 
Consequently, the third extension I undertake consists in swapping the real depreciation with the 
Selic interest rate. From Table 6, in which the results of the FEV are reported, we can reach 
conclusions  which  are  similar  to  those  illustrated  above  for  inflation,  external  debt,  primary 
deficit, and EMBI spread. This time, however, the forecast error volatility of the Selic rate seems 
to  be  more  importantly  affected  by  the  innovation  of  foreign  factors  than  in  the  previous 
extension.  Plausibly,  this  is  the  by-product  of  having  excluded  the  real  devaluation  variable; 
notably, there are no similar effects on the other Brazilian series.  
 




deficit   Inflation  Selic    
 External 
debt  EMBI 
1  2.62  3.14 3.89 2.10  12.57  31.14 
3  15.53  6.91 12.30 9.65  29.33  36.36 
6  19.18  10.19 20.97 23.44  40.58  42.85 
9  20.04  16.56 25.13 31.35  50.16  47.15 
12  21.59  24.11 27.80 36.03  57.80  50.16 
16  24.33  33.75 30.06 39.87  73.74  52.77 
24  29.38  47.72 31.10 39.87  73.74  55.27 
Table 6. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US_BAA spread and US_FFR. 
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As regards the historical decomposition of the variables, I refer to the combined Figure 19.  
  The fourth extension consists in using the monthly change (in annual terms) of Brazilian 
real GDP and the monthly change (in annual terms) of US industrial production index
42. The 
following Table reports the relative contribution of foreign factors to the forecast variance of the 
Brazilian domestic series.  Comparing these values with those in Table 1, a few results turn out to 
be different. In the first place, the foreign contribution to the fluctuations of external debt and the 
EMBI spread falls by about 11%. Moreover, the volatility of inflation due to foreign factors is 
reduced dramatically.  
 







depreciation  Inflation 
 External 
debt  EMBI 
1  1.93  2.54 1.06 5.56  19.17  32.18 
3  11.60  5.67 9.76 8.77  31.45  30.61 
6  12.99  10.92 10.55 11.63  40.83  33.37 
9  13.48  18.35 11.05 12.14  47.37  35.77 
12  13.74  25.13 11.45 12.33  52.94  38.35 
16  13.91  32.51 11.72 12.77  59.32  41.67 
24  14.07  44.25 11.84 14.01  69.02  46.83 
Table 7. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_indus_gr, US_BAA spread and US_FFR. 
 
This does not amount to saying that monthly changes in the real GDP growth are more important 
than the output gap in determining the forecast volatility of inflation; rather, this is the joint effect 
of different estimated residuals and diverse VAR projections. The inspection of the historical 
decompositions, in effect, reveals that the base projection of inflation in the basic model (see 
Figure 9) tends to exceed the actual values of inflation in 2001 and first half of 2002: foreign 
shocks are important because they contribute to closing this gap. Such an effect does not occur 
when the rates of growth are encompassed in the model. Besides this important change, the main 
results of the exercise remain unaffected by the adoption of these different output measures. 
To conclude this section, I address an objection that might be raised with respect to the 
modelling choices I have made for the US. Arguably, the peculiar situation the US went through 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 makes the sample under scrutiny quite delicate. As claimed by 
                                                 
42 Growth rates of change have been used by Garcia and Rigobon (2005), and Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2005), 
among the others. Since Brazil has monthly data on GDP while the US does not, I use the industrial production index 
for the US.    
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Chairman Greenspan and other members of the FOMC, the US monetary authorities kept the 
interest  rates  at  unusually  low  levels  during  2002,  for  they  feared  the  consequences  of  a 
prospective deflationary process. According to this reasoning, the VAR model should be adjusted 
in the US block so that the peculiarity of such a period is duly taken into account. Failing this, 
there is the risk of taking the abrupt change in the levels of the BAA spread and FFR for a series 
of different shocks. In order to tackle this concern, I re-estimate the VAR system illustrated in 
Section 4, including in the equations of the US exogenous block a dummy variable, taking value 
1 in the period from 2001:09 to 2003:1
43. To briefly summarise the more important outcomes that 
will be reported below, let me point out the three main results of this extension. The first is that it 
confirms that foreign factors importantly contribute to determine the (forecast) error variance of 
Brazilian  domestic  variables.  The  second  is  that,  in  the  historical  decomposition,  the  base 
projection of the model improves remarkably for all variables. The third and last result is that 
foreign factors remain important determinants of the historical decomposition of the Brazilian 
domestic variables even after this dummy is encompassed in the system.  
 








debt  EMBI 
1  3.35  4.54  0.55  2.88  20.90  27.10 
3  18.91  8.35  9.47  8.83  36.16  31.79 
6  23.10  14.23  10.49  20.17  46.52  38.51 
9  23.96  21.75  10.84  28.00  53.23  42.38 
12  27.25  27.59  11.17  32.57  57.36  44.11 
16  31.71  33.31  11.74  35.30  60.53  44.83 
24  35.75  40.22  12.52  38.56  63.91  45.56 
Table 8. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US_BAA spread and FFR. 
 
  The  contribution  of  foreign  factors  to  the  forecast  error  variance  of  the  Brazilian  domestic 
variables reported in Table 8 is self-explanatory. With the exception of the real depreciation, 
foreign factors count at least for 1/3 of the overall forecast volatility of the domestic variables. 
With respect to the results for the benchmark model (Table 1), the main differences reside in their 
relative contributions to the external debt and the EMBI spread. Despite remaining considerably 
                                                 
43 It is worth noticing that, while Goretti (2005) allows for a temporary structural change in the constant of the 
Brazilian domestic equations, I consider here a similar extension for the US  (i.e. foreign) block. Admittedly, while 
her switch is endogenously identified, here it is imposed on a priori basis. Focusing on the US block, however, is in 
line with trying to disentangle correctly the effects of foreign and domestic factors, as it is well-known that 9/11 and 
the stock market crash are both US and global shocks.     
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high, the relative importance of the foreign factors falls by about 13%. This finding does not 
entail that foreign factors are not important for the Brazilian economy as a whole. In fact, as it 
can  be  derived  from  the  observation  of  the  historical  decomposition,  the  foreign  variables, 
besides their impact on the forecast volatility, also have an important level effect on the base 
projections which, as anticipated above, are closer to the actual data
44. It follows that, although 
relevant, this extension does not alter the main conclusions drawn from the exercises above. 
                                                 
44 This is also valid for each of the other extensions considered in this section.   
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Figure 18. Historical decomposition (2001:1 2004:01) of the Brazilian series.    
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Historical decomposition (Selic included & Real depreciation excluded)
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Figure 19. Historical decomposition (2001:1 2004:01) of the Brazilian series.    
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Historical decomposition using rates of growth
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Figure 20. Historical decomposition (2001:1 2004:01) of the Brazilian series using the rate of growth rather than the cyclical components of output.    
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Historical decomposition with a dummy for US in 2001:09-2003:1
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Figure 21. Historical decomposition (2001:1 2004:01) of the Brazilian series using a dummy variable for the period 2001:09 – 2003:01  7.  Identifying  the  model :  suggestions  from  the  impulse  response 
functions. 
 
7.1 The identification strategy. 
 
Once the VAR model (4) is estimated, it is possible to obtain the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) of each endogenous variable to the various innovations in the system. In order to do so, it 
is necessary to identify the entire structural model, that is all the parameters of matrix A
45. In the 
literature, at least to my knowledge, four kinds of identification strategies have been developed. 
The first consists in ordering the variables according to the lags that, presumably, characterise the 
transmission  of  the  shocks  across  the  variables.  (This  is  obtained  by  means  of  a  triangular 
Choleski decomposition). The second one is based on the choice of definite values (mainly ±1 
and 0) for some parameters of matrix A, and on the imposition of some specific relationships 
between the parameters. The third technique rests on the exploitation of sign restrictions; this 
technique is similar to the previous one but for the imposition of signs, rather than values, to the 
parameters  of  matrix  A.  The  fourth  method  consists  in  setting  restrictions  on  the  long  run 
interactions of the variables (i.e. imposing restrictions on B(1)), such as the long run separation 
between nominal and real variables. For the reasons illustrated in the previous sections, any of 
these strategies is subject to qualms and reservations, and the IRFs of each variable depend on the 
identification strategy adopted. Since I shall resort to the first of the abovementioned techniques, 
I shall briefly describe its main features here. The Choleski decomposition is a rather mechanical 
method to impose a triangular form to matrix A. If matrix A is upper triangular, the first variable 
of  the  vector  yt  is  not  contemporaneously  affected  by  the  other  variables,  yet  it  has  a 
contemporaneous  impact  on  all  the  others.  Conversely,  the  last  variable  in  vector  yt  is 
contemporaneously affected by all the other variables and does not simultaneously influence any 
of them. Adopting a Choleski decomposition is equivalent to imposing a recursive structure to the 
system (that is, to matrix A). Clearly, the imposition of a recursive structure to the system is often 
a questionable choice since the researcher has to decide upon the order of the contemporaneous 
effects of the variables without a well-grounded a priori knowledge. Nonetheless, there are some 
theoretical intuitions that help order the variables. For instance, it is usually accepted that real 
variables immediately affect nominal variables, while the latter affect the former with one or 
                                                 
45 To be precise, if I were to use generalized FEV and IRFs, this would not be necessary. However, generalized FEV 
and IRFs do not allow disentangling the impact of individual shocks. See Agenor et al. (2002) for a description of 
this method.    
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more lags. Crucially, “the importance of the ordering depends on the magnitude of the correlation 
coefficient between” (Enders 2003 p.309) the residuals of the system. As a rule of thumb, if the 
correlation between two series of residuals is larger than 0.2 (in absolute value), the ordering is 
likely to be relevant. If it is lower, the ordering is immaterial. (Enders 2003 p. 309). In Appendix 
B, I apply the criterion suggested by Enders to the VAR residuals obtained with the identification 
scheme I shall use in the remaining of the work. 
In  what  follows,  I  shall  produce  and  comment  upon  the  results  one  can  draw  from 
imposing a recursive order to the system. Although it is not the main goal of the paper, I have 
decided to undertake this additional exercise because I intend to offer some insights on external 
debt,  inflation  and  EMBI  spread  dynamics,  and  on  their  relationships  with  foreign  external 
factors. The ordering I adopt for the recursive identification model (4), is US_cycle￿  US_FFR 
(or US_10y) ￿ US_BAA spread ￿ Br_Cycle￿ Br_Primary Deficit￿ Br_Real Depreciation￿ 
Br_Inflation￿ Br_extdebt-over-gdp ￿ Br_EMBI spread. This identification strategy is based on 
the idea that i) foreign variables are block exogenous and ii) nominal variables affect the real 
ones  only  with  a  lag.  The  ordering  of  Brazilian  cycle,  primary  deficit,  real  depreciation  and 
inflation is followed also by Garcia and Rigobon (2005) and Minella (2003). External debt comes 
after the nominal variables because its value (when it is denominated in foreign currency) adjusts 
immediately after a change in the exchange rate. Since the EMBI spread is a financial variable, 
volatile and depending on a very large set of factors, it is ordered last.
46  
 
7.2 The impulse response functions. 
 
Having applied the abovementioned ordering of the variables, it is possible to decompose 
the  variance/covariance  matrix  of  the  residuals  of  the  VAR  model  and  simulate  the  impulse 
responses of the various series to the shocks hitting the system. I report the results of such an 
exercise in Figure 22 when the FFR is included, and in Figure 23 when the US_10y yield is 
embedded
47. In what follows, I will shortly discuss these figures in relation to the economic 
intuitions proposed in Section 3. In particular, as it has been repeated several times that the BAA 
spread plays a central role in explaining the evolution of most of Brazilian domestic variables, the 
discussion will focus on the impact of innovations to the BAA spread on the variables of interest, 
namely Brazilian inflation and EMBI spread.  
                                                 
46 On the basis of the correlation indices of the VAR residuals, I consider an alternative ordering so as to make the 
EMBI spread coming before the real depreciation and after the deficit. This extension will be discussed in Appendix 
B. 
47 The confidence intervals are calculated by means of 4000 MonteCarlo simulations. The technique, employed by 
Sims and Zha (1999), is necessary for the model is near-VAR.     
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Let me start with looking first at Figure 22. The impulse response function of the EMBI 
spread to a shock to the BAA spread follows economic intuition. The Brazilian EMBI spread 
increases  more  than  proportionally  and,  absent  any  intervention,  remain  affected  also  in  the 
medium term. Brazilian inflation reacts negatively on impact  – I shall come back to this at the 
end of the section - but it is permanently positively affected thereafter, probably because of the 
real depreciation lasting a few periods. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, positive shocks to 
global  appetite  for  risk  tend  to  have  an  inflationary  impact  on  the  Brazilian  economy.  The 
primary deficit improves in correspondence to  a positive shock to the  US_BAA spread: this 
seems to indicate that, in times of low appetite for risk, Brazilian authorities increase the fiscal 
discipline (and vice versa). This is a recommendable policy stance which goes hand in hand with 
prudential considerations. 
If the impact of innovations to the EMBI spread is considered, it turns out that they, and 
their effects, are quite persistent. According to the predictions of the new “fiscal dominance” 
approach,  they  tend  to  generate  temporary  domestic  inflation  and  a  real  depreciation  of  the 
currency. In light of these findings, one could conclude that the shocks to both global appetite for 
risk and Brazil EMBI spread tend to boost Brazilian inflation. They differ, however, in that only 
the former leads to an increase in the external debt. It is also worth noticing that, while domestic 
inflationary shocks lead to an increase in the cyclical components of the Brazilian production 
index, the inflationary burst caused by changes in both spreads is associated with a contraction in 
the production. Finally, a US monetary shock leads to a temporary increase in the EMBI spread
48.  
Admittedly, a close inspection of figure 22 also reveals some odd results, which may cast 
some doubts on the validity of the identification strategy. On the one hand, a positive shock to 
Brazilian inflation causes a real appreciation of the exchange rate and a small improvement in 
GDP, as one would have expected; on the other hand, however, the EMBI spread reacts oddly to 
such a shock, since it tends to fall when inflation spikes up. This is probably due to the fact that 
the debt-GDP ratio falls after the increase in the nominal GDP level and the real appreciation. If 
the  EMBI  spread  is  mainly  affected  by  the  level  of  debt,  this  conclusion  makes  sense:  the 
inflationary shock reduces the ratio of debt over GDP in the very short run. It could be argued, 
however, that the fact that a spike in inflation causes a negative response in the EMBI spread 
does not follow common sense, and this is particularly the case in a country where the ability to 
keep  inflation  under  control  is  a  rough  measure  of  the  political  commitment  to  stabilise  the 
economy. One possible explanation is that shocks to Brazilian inflation are not persistent and, 
                                                 
48 Most of the results, where comparable, are consistent with those in Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2005). The impact of 
the US_FFR on the EMBI spread, in particular,  is similar to that in Uribe and Yue (2006).    
  48 
since they do not jeopardize the overall ability of the central bank to keep inflation under control, 
they are not directly mirrored by a spike in the EMBI spread.  
Let me move on now to Figure 23; there  I report the IRFs for one of the extensions 
considered  earlier,  that  is  the  swap  between  US_10y  and  FFR.  Most  of  the  results  are  not 
different from those discussed above, but let me briefly mention only a few peculiar ones. First, 
the US_10y yield is negatively related on impact and positively related afterwards with BAA and 
EMBI credit spreads
49. Second, since a shock to US_10y is associated with a spike in inflation 
and no real depreciation, there must be a nominal depreciation which is almost equal to the 
difference between domestic and US inflation rates. 
Although  many  of  the  IRFs  follow  economic  intuition  over  the  medium/long  run,  in 
general, the immediate impact of the innovations on the variables seems, in same cases, counter-
intuitive. This is particularly true in the case of foreign shocks. My hunch is that this depends on 
the identification strategy proposed above: since using a Choleski decomposition is equivalent to 
imposing a unique ordering on the variables, this might be suboptimal in the case of foreign 
financial variables. The reasoning goes as follows. In the real world, any innovation to the BAA 
spread is likely to be immediately transmitted to the EMBI spread and, only after a few lags, to 
the  other  (nominal  and  real)  macroeconomic  variables.  This  supposition  hinges  on  the 
observation that shocks are in general transmitted faster across financial than macroeconomic 
variables. The choice of leaving both BAA and EMBI spreads as the last variable in each (foreign 
and domestic) block hinges on this principle. However, this very same idea is contradicted by the 
overall ordering of the  foreign and domestic variables, with the domestic Brazilian variables 
coming after the BAA spread and before the EMBI spread. Accordingly, the BAA spread affects 
all  domestic  Brazilian  variables  immediately,  and  the  EMBI  spread  is  not  the  first  to  be 
influenced. Such ordering of the variables, however, cannot be modified since the foreign block 
needs  be  separate  from  the  domestic  one  if  one  wants  to  exploit  the  block  exogeneity 
assumption
50. If the innovations to the BAA spread affect all domestic Brazilian variables, and 
each of these has an impact on the EMBI spread, there is some interference in the direct impact of 
BAA spread shocks on the latter. As said, unfortunately, there is no way to solve such a problem 
without  resorting  to  a  structural  identification  strategy  which  imposes  extra  lags  in  the 
transmission mechanism of BAA spread shocks to the Brazilian series. This extension, however, 
goes far beyond the scope of this model and, therefore, it is left for future research. 
                                                 
49 Most of the results, where comparable, are consistent with those in Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz (2005). 
50 In Appendix B I shall amend the model so as to anticipate the EMBI spread in the ordering. Such a move changes 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 22. The Impulse response functions of the variables to various shocks. Baseline model (table 1).     



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 23. The Impulse response functions of the variables to various shocks. Baseline model with US_10y (table 4).  8. Closing remarks. 
 
This work focuses on the impact of foreign global shocks on the behaviour of domestic 
macroeconomic variables (in particular external debt and EMBI spread), in Brazil. A VAR system 
encompassing 6 domestic and 3 foreign variables, which proxy global factors, is estimated for 
Brazil from January 1999 to January 2004. In order to fully grasp the contribution of credit risk 
premia and foreign investors’ appetite for risk to the overall macroeconomic volatility, EMBI and 
US_BAA corporate spreads are included among the variables of the system. 
  A partial identification strategy, which exploits the block exogeneity of foreign variables 
with respect to the domestic ones, allows i) deriving the contribution of foreign variables to the 
forecast error variance of the domestic ones and ii) performing the historical decomposition of the 
series under investigation. The results of these two analyses suggest that almost all the Brazilian 
series, in particular EMBI spread and external debt, are strongly affected by foreign exogenous 
innovations.  
  In the last section, a full identification of the system allows studying the implied IRFs of 
the system. Conditional on the identification strategy adopted, most of the IRFs for each of the 
variables confirm the importance of the innovations of the foreign factors.  
Several  findings  support  the  existence  of  the  unconventional  channel  of  transmission 
suggested by Blanchard, whereby changes either in foreign appetite for risk or in the domestic 
determinants of debt sustainability can bring about domestic inflation without monetary policy 
being expansionary. The policy recommendation that can be drawn from this observation is that 
the innovations in the foreign degree of risk aversion, and in other global factors, have to be taken 
into account by fiscal and monetary authorities. The inflationary pressures stemming from such 
external sources of volatility have to be treated with care. 
All  in  all, the  findings  and  observations  reported  in  the  main text  and the  appendices 
provide  support  to  the  hypothesis  that  foreign  factors  are  important  determinants  of  the 
development of the domestic Brazilian variables. In particular, global appetite for risk  (and its 
counterpart, i.e. global risk aversion) turns out to be a very important factor to consider. It follows 
that researchers and policymakers interested in the evolution of credit risk premia and external 
debt in an open emerging market economy, should take global risk aversion into due account.     
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Appendix A. Small scale model 
 
It could be argued that 9 variables risk overfitting the model. In this section, I shall present the 
results  obtained  by  estimating  a  near-VAR  model  where  only  US_cycle,  US_FFR,  US_BAA 
spread, Brazilian external debt and Brazilian EMBI spread are included. In light of the extensions 
considered in the main text, I report the results of this model when the dummy for the US in 
2001:09-2003:01 is both included and excluded. The results of interest do not change with the 
exclusion of the other domestic Brazilian variables. This is not surprising since the decomposition 
moves around the identification of foreign innovations, not of the domestic ones.  
 
 
Without dummy for US 
in 2001:09 – 2003:01 
  With dummy for US in 
2001:09 – 2003:01 
horizon    
 External 
debt  EMBI 
  External 
debt  
EM BI 
1  13.16  32.72  14.62 27.48
3  34.25  36.98  34.63 32.21
6  52.28  45.36  50.47 40.05
9  63.13  51  58.90 44.26
12  70.24  54.88  63.99 46.31
16  76.29  58.08  68.08 47.29
24  82.38  60.67  71.73 47.73
Table A.1. Contribution of foreign variables to the forecast error variance of domestic variables 
Note: Foreign variables are US_cycle, US_FFR and  US_BAA spread. 
 
As already mentioned in the other extensions in the text, omitting relevant variables from the 
system tends to affect the estimated contribution to the forecast variance. Although the omission 
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Appendix B. Correlations of the VAR residuals 
 
The correlations of the VAR residuals help understand if the ordering of the variables is 
either immaterial or, rather, crucial. As said in the text, Enders suggests considering the ordering 
as immaterial if the correlation between two variables is, in absolute value, smaller than 0.2. In 
Table  B.1,  which  represents  the  correlations  matrix  of  the  VAR  residuals,  I  highlight  those 
correlation indices exceeding such a “rule-of-thumb” critical level.  I shall then discuss the chosen 






















US_cycle  1.000               
US_FFRs   0.145 1.000              
BAAspread  0.013 0.114  1.000            
Br_cycle  0.018 0.143  -0.096  1.000          
Primary 
deficit  -0.035 -0.109  -0.171 -0.134  1.000        
Real 
depreciation  0.066 0.047  0.022 -0.041  0.041  1.000       
Inflation  0.028 -0.129  -0.140 -0.116  0.097  0.125  1.000    
External debt   0.033 -0.047  0.409 -0.028  -0.192  0.319  -0.063  1.000  
Embi 
  0.186 0.080  0.532 -0.145  -0.135  0.330  -0.061       0.622        1.00000 
Table B.1. Correlations of the residuals from VAR (4).  
 
Correlation indices are larger (in absolute value) than 0.2 only for the equations relative to 
external debt and EMBI spread. Let me now discuss briefly to what extent these findings can cast 
doubts on the identification strategy adopted in the work. To begin with, the correlation 0.622 
between  the  residuals  of  the  last  two  variables  can  hardly  lead  to  inverting  the  order  of  the 
variables. In fact, there are good economic reasons to believe that while changes in the external 
debt level immediately affect the EMBI spread, the latter has an impact on the former only after 
some  lags.  Reverting  the  order  would  not  make  economic  sense.  The  other  high  correlation 
indices regard BAA and EMBI spreads. Once the exogenous block assumption is accepted, the 
correlation  between  US_BAA  spread  residuals  and  those  of  the  other  endogenous  domestic 
variables does not represent an issue. Again, reverting the ordering would entail dropping the 
block exogeneity assumption altogether.     
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Some attention should also be devoted to the correlation indices between the residuals of the real 
depreciation equation, on the one hand, and the external debt and EMBI spread on the other. 
There is no reason to doubt  that the direction of causality goes from the real depreciation to the 
external debt. Conversely, the relationship between the real depreciation and the EMBI spread is 
not uncontroversial. The ordering adopted in the text ensures that innovations to the EMBI spread 
perculate  into  the  other  domestic  variables  with  one  lag;  moving  the  EMBI  spread  before 
depreciation  would  revert  the  lag.  To  see  whether  the  choice  of  setting  the  EMBI  spread  as 
following the real depreciation in the ordering strongly affects the results. Let me propose the 
following alternative ordering: US-cycle￿  US_FFR ￿ US_BAA spread ￿ Brazilian_Cycle￿ 
Br_PrimaryDeficit￿  Br_EMBI  spread  ￿  Br_RealDepreciation￿  Br_Inflation￿  Br_ext_debt 
over GDP. The IRFs are represented in Figure B.1. When the EMBI spread is moved before real 
depreciation and inflation, only a few results change. In particular, it turns out that innovations to 
the real depreciations do not affect the EMBI spread at any lag, whereas the influence of EMBI 
spread shocks on the depreciation of the exchange rate is amplified. As a consequence, on impact 
the external debt grows. Note that the criterion that the real variables come before the nominal 
ones is immaterial in this setting.  
Finally,  the  ordering  between  the  real  depreciation  and  inflation  is  subject  to  possible 
criticism.  Yet,  three  arguments  indicate  that  it  is  not  an  unreasonable  assumption.  First,  the 
correlation  indices  support  the  ordering  or,  at  least,  downplay  its  importance.  Second,  this 
ordering is maintained in most of the works applying VAR models on the Brazilian series
51. 
Third, such sequencing follows the theoretical reasoning  (à la Blanchard) illustrated in Section 3. 
In practice, ceteris paribus, nominal depreciations (which lead to real depreciations if inflation 
follows)  cause  an  increase  in  the  imported  inflation  and,  therefore,  in  the  domestic  rate  of 
inflation. According to Blanchard’s theory, abrupt changes in the nominal exchange rate are often 
caused by harsh reversals of capital flows, which in their turn can be determined by shifts in the 
appetite for risk of foreign investors (i.e. US_BAA spread). This chain of causation is respected 
here since the US_BAA spread precedes real depreciation in the ordering, and real depreciation 
comes before inflation.  
                                                 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.1. The Impulse response functions of the variables to various shocks. Baseline model with EMBI preceding other nominal variables. Appendix C. Near-VAR estimates and tests. 
 
 
In what follows I reproduce the results of the VAR estimation and a few statistical tests on each of 
the equations of the near VAR system. The estimates in table C.1 refer to the specification of the 
model discussed in section 6 which includes a dummy variable so as to capture the unusually low 
US interest rates during 2002. 
 
Not surprisingly, the empirical fit of the various equations looks quite good. This is certainly due 
to the number of relevant regressors included in the estimations and the relatively high importance 
of the autoregressive terms in explaining the dynamics of current values. 
 
The values of the coefficients are as expected. In general the lagged values of each dependent 
variable are highly significant whereas the significance of the lagged values of the other variables 
varies across the equations. In a few equations, the two lagged values of some variables turn out 
to be insignificant. This is the case, for instance, of the BAA_spread in the EMBI equation. This 
finding  does  not  entail  that  the  former  variable,  at  all  leads  and  lags,  is  an  unimportant 
determinant  of  the  latter.  In  fact,  as  it  appears  clearly  from  the  IRFs  in  section  7,  the 
contemporaneous impact of the BAA_spread fluctuations on the Brazilian domestic variables is 
significant and often large. Both EMBI and BAA spread measures are financial variables: the 
strength  of  their  contemporaneous  relationship  is  not  surprisingly  higher  than  that  of  lagged 
values and the scant significance of lagged BAA spread in the EMBI equation is likely due to this 
reason. 
 
Even though the significance of the various regressors differs considerably across equations, there 
is no variable whose lagged values are insignificant in all equations. This supports the inclusion of 
these 9 variables in the VAR system and corroborates the results of the model selection statistics 
calculated on the whole system. It should also be noted that the dummy variables included in the 
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-83.76  32.49 
** 
31.27 
……_2  0.066  -12.36 
*** 














0.19  0.062 
*** 
-0.05  -10.61  4.786  0.58  2.07 




-0.18  -0.061 
*** 
0.02  27.51  -3.32  -0.49  -2.05 
US 
BAA _ 1 




-0.018  0.01  0.20  -6.23 
*** 
0.46  0.52 
……_2  -0.0015  -0.005  0.040  0.0455 
*** 
0.07  60.80  4.03 
* 
-0.05  0.51 
Br_ 
Cycle _1 




13.66  16.30  0.65  3.64 
……_2        0.183 
** 






      -0.002  0.800 
*** 
7.68  -0.24  0.06  1.06 
* 
…… _2        0.001  -0.01  -0.166  -0.35  -0.003  -0.94* 
Br_ 
Deprec _1 
      0.00003 
* 













-0.0003  -0.0007 
Br_ 
Inflation_1 
      0.0010 
** 








……_2        -0.011 
** 





























      0.002 
* 
0.021  -1.44  0.89 
*** 
0.04  0.76 
*** 
……_2        -0.004 
*** 
-0.006  9.60  0.34 
 
0.037  0.14 












0.055  1.26 
D_us  -0.0006  -0.089  0.20 ***             
D_floating        -0.07 
*** 
-0.267  1317.2 
*** 




US_Infl     -0.357               
US_Infl 
_1 
  -0.0075               
US_Infl 
_2 
  0.0111               
R
2  0.96  0.99  0.97  0.84  0.98  0.94  0.93  0.99  0.93 
Jarque-
Bera         
0.68  4.30  56.01 
(Kurt) 









test         






13.21  21.00 
* 
7.14 












Arch LM          1.14  4.12  10.22 
* 
2.35  2.95  33.94 
*** 




Table C.1. Near VAR estimates and equation-by-equation test statistics.    
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The test statistics reported at the bottom of the table refer to the usual test for the normality of the 
errors (Jacque Bera test), the remaining serial correlation of the errors (Ljung-Box and Breush-
Pagan test) and the homoskedasticity of the errors (Arch LM test). The US equations appear to be 
well defined, even though there is some inconsistency between the Ljung-Box and the BP LM 
tests. The residuals of the Brazilian equations, instead, are less satisfactory. With the exception of 
the Inflation and Industrial Cycle equations, the residuals do not look normal and are, probably, 
partially correlated. This would suggest to increase the number of lagged values of the variables in 
the model. However, the addition of few lags does not considerably change the results while the 
inclusion of 1 to 12 lags erodes degrees of freedom. Admittedly, these findings cast some doubts 
on the overall fit of the model. In commenting upon these test statistics, however, it is worth 
recalling  that  while  the  VAR  specification  is  chosen  on  the  ground  of  some  model  selection 
statistics which regard the whole near-VAR system, the statistics reported below are drawn on an 
equation-by-equation basis. This suggests that while the system can hardly be improved by means 
of an extension of the number of lagged values common to all equations, it might be improved on 
the  basis  of  an  equation-by-equation  selection  procedure.  The  latter,  however,  implies  the 
imposition of additional restrictions to the overall system which implicitly makes the system over-
identified. This is the reason why, in the VAR literature, it is uncommon to apply an equation-by-
equation specification procedure and the model selection is usually run on the basis of tests on the 
whole system. In this work, while acknowledging that improvements coming from a different 
modelling strategy are possible, I follow the literature and refer to the complete-model selection 
criteria. 